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THE  PHYSICS  OF  IDEALISM 


By  EDGAR  LENDERSON  HINMAN 


THE  PHYSICS  OF  IDEALISM 


A    ^hesis  Presented 


TO  THE 


University  Faculty  of  Cornell  University 


FOR  THE 


Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 


EDGAR  LENDERSON  HINMAN 


LINCOLN,  NEB.: 
JOURNAL  COMPANY,  PRINTERS 
1006 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I.     Kant's  Metaphysic  of  Nature 17 

A.  Its  Significance  for  Idealistic  Speculative  Physics,  17 

B.  Outline  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature 18 

C.  Critical  Analysis    26 

CHAPTER  II.     Schelling's  Construction  of  Matter 38 

A.  Transition  to   Schelling 38 

B.  The  Metaphysical  Point  of  Departure  of  the  Phi- 

losophy of  Nature 40 

C.  The   Problem    and    Method    of   the   Philosophy    of 

Nature     46 

D.  Relation  of  the  Idea  of  Matter  to  the  Theory  of 

Perception    52 

E.  Matter  as  a  Force- Product 59 

F.  Gravitation  as  a  Systematizing  Factor 60 

CHAPTER  III.     Conclusion  .  78 


(3) 


INTRODUCTION. 

In  discussing  the  attitude  of  idealism  towards  the  meta- 
physics of  natural  science  one  is  embarrassed  at  the  outset 
by  the  indefiniteness  of  the  term  idealism.  Systems  which  are 
called  idealistic  differ  radically  in  character,  as  do  those  of 
Leibniz  and  Berkeley.  Many  of  them  exhibit  features  which 
are  supposed  to  be  characteristic  of  realism.  Yet  the  distinc- 
tion between  realism  and  idealism  is  a  time-honored  one.  and 
cannot  be  without  significance.  It  is  therefore  important  to 
determine  with  some  precision  in  what  this  distinction  con- 
sists. 

Two  criteria  often  used  to  make  the  distinction  appear  to 
the  writer  to  be  of  very  inferior  value.  According  to  one,  an 
idealist  is  a  thinker  who  denies  that  the  external  world  and 
the  objects  of  knowledge  possess  a  reality  independent  of  the 
perception  or  thought  by  which  they  form  a  part  of  his  con- 
sciousness. Their  esse  is  percipi.  and  in  addition  to  their 
reality  as  perception  no  sort  of  existence  can  be  ascribed  to 
them.  The  realist,  on  the  other  hand,  urges  that  things  exist 
by  themselves,  and  that  afterwards  a  knowing  mind  may  hap- 
pen to  perceive  them — or  it  may  not,  the  incident  being  of  no 
great  significance. 

There  is  no  doubt  much  excuse  for  resting  the  distinction 
upon  the  denial  of  an  objective  world  independent  of  con- 
sciousness. The  general  contention  of  idealism,  both  in  Eng- 
land and  Germany,  has  been  that  the  reality  of  the  object  con- 
sists in  nothing  else  than  being  perceived.  Except  as  related 
to  consciousness,  it  is  urged,  no  meaning  can  be  ascribed  to 
objectivity.  With  Berkeley  insisting  that  the  esse  of  things 
is  nothing  but  their  percipi,  and  with  Fichte  striving  to  show 
how  the  Ego  constructs  the  world  by  its  own  spontaneity,  the 

(5) 


6  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

foregoing  characterization  has  seemed  just  and  has  won  wide 
acceptance. 

The  extreme  subjectivism  which  this  statement  of  the 
idealistic  position  entails  is  a  matter  of  regret.  Wherever  it 
is  dominant  idealism  fights  at  a  marked  disadvantage.  The 
suppression  of  subjectivism  has  been  the  perennial  struggle 
of  the  idealist. 

The  idealist  does  not  actually  mean  that  the  mind  of  the 
individual  constructs  for  itself  a  field  of  consciousness  which 
is  its  universe,  and  that  the  universe  so  known  carries  with  it 
no  implication  or  evidence  of  an  existent  reality  external  to 
the  consciousness  of  the  individual  mind.  He  can  no  more 
dispense  with  such  a  reality  than  his  opponent  can  dispense 
with  the  material  world.  It  is  the  principle  which  makes 
the  world  a  system,  and  causes  the  universe  constructed  by 
one  mind  to  harmonize  with  that  constructed  by  another. 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  individual,  this  may  be  called  an 
external  world.  It  is  not  external  to  the  mind,  if  by  external 
we  understand  something  opposed  to  the  mind  and  distinct 
from  it.  On  the  contrary,  for  most  forms  of  idealism  this 
universal  principle  must  be  immanent  in  the  mind,  and  may 
in  this  sense  be  called  internal.  It  is  external,  however,  in 
the  sense  that  it  involves  immensely  more  than  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  single  individual.  Its  sphere  of  activity  lies 
largely  outside  the  consciousness  of  the  finite  subject,  and 
it  is  in  this  extra-mental  sphere  that  we  must  find  the  ground 
and  explanation  of  the  cosmic  order. 

Berkeley  eliminates  from  his  philosophy  the  material 
world,  but  he  is  able  to  do  this  only  by  calling  to  his  assistance 
the  mind  of  God.  The  perceptions  of  objects  are  aroused  in 
the  conscious  subject  by  God.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the 
existence  in  my  mind  of  a  given  perception  does  involve  some 
evidence  of  a  universe  external  to  myself.  It  implies  the 
activity  of  God.  When  Berkeley  urges  that  its  esse  is  percipi 
and  nothing  more,  he  is  impelled  by  a  motive  wrhich  he  does 


THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM.  7 

not  really  understand  or  properly  state.  His  real  motive  is 
to  deny  that  subject  and  object  are  given  in  absolute  dualism; 
to  assert  that  the  two  are  given  as  differences  in  a  common 
principle,  and  in  the  medium  of  mind-life.  Epistemological 
necessities  led  him  to  accent  the  mental  medium,  and  even  to 
treat  it  as  the  perceptual  act;  but  he  did  not  rigorously  and 
consistently  restrict  the  entire  reality  of  the  object  known  to 
the  perceptual  product.  Berkeley  was  concerned,  it  is  true, 
more  with  the  destructive  argument  against  materialism,  and 
gave  only  an  imperfect  development  to  the  positive  aspect  of 
his  system.  Until  this  aspect  is  satisfactorily  worked  out, 
however,  Dr.  Johnson's  refutation  of  Berkeleianism  is  in 
order,  and  the  distrust  with  which  the  ordinary  man  regards 
idealism  is  sound  and  just. 

Fichte  apparently  dispenses  not  only  with  the  material 
world  but  also  with  the  Divine  mind,  and  regards  the  universe 
as  the  free  creation  of  the  Ego.  As  the  system  develops,  how- 
ever, it  becomes  evident  that  Ego  is  only  another  name  for 
Spirit,  and  that  the  mind  of  any  particular  man  is  but  a 
small  part  of  the  Ego  which  creates  the  whole  universe.  %  The 
finite  Ego  is  the  same  in  its  nature  and  life  as  the  absolute 
Ego,  but  is  less  extensive.  "All  individuals  are  included  in 
die  one  great  unity  of  pure  spirit."  :  This  tendency  to  go  be- 
yond the  finite  Ego  to  an  absolute  Ego  appears  more  dis- 
tinctly in  Schelling's  early  efforts  to  supplement  and  perfect 
the  system  of  Fichte,  but  it  is  apparent  in  the  works  of 
Fichte  himself.  As  with  Berkeley,  so  with  Fichte,  the  spirit- 
ual principle  to  which  we  are  forced  to  refer  the  cosmic  order 
is  in  large  measure  beyond  the  consciousness  of  the  finite 
m;nd.  Of  one  texture  with  the  finite  thinker,  it  is  by  no  means 
a  mere  phenomenon  to  the  human  percipient. 

It  is  an  inadequate  and  unfair  definition  of  idealism,  then, 
which  makes  its  essence  consist  in  maintaining  that  the  ex- 
ternal world  has  no  reality  farther  than  that  of  being  per- 

1  Dignity  of  Man,  Eng-.  translation  by  Kroeger,  p.  336. 


8  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

ceived.  Some  kind  of  external  reality  must  be  admitted  if  we 
are  to  regard  the  universe  as  anything  more  than  a  disordered 
series  of  irrational  mental  states.  Idealism  differs  from  real 
ism,  not  by  denying  the  necessity  of  assuming  for  the  explana- 
tion of  perception  a  principle  which  transcends  the  individual 
mind,  but  by  certain  deeper  criteria  of  which  this  is  but  an 
imperfect  epistemological  expression. 

Equally  unsatisfactory  is  the  second  criterion  to  be  men 
tioned.  Some  men  would  consider  any  philosophy  realism 
which  holds  that  there  are  beings  distinct  from  the  mind,  and 
that  these  beings  act  causally  upon  the  mind  to  produce 
perception.  On  this  view  the  realities  might  be  of  the  same 
nature  as  the  mind,  so  that  all  existence  is  spiritual;  yet  as 
a  truly  causal  interaction  is  admitted,  any  individual  must 
grant  that  his  perceptions  are  caused  by  realities  external  to 
himself.  The  monadology  of  Leibniz  becomes  realism,  then, 
as  soon  as  we  admit  that  the  monads  have  windows. 

Much  evidence  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Fichte,  Schel 
ling,  and  other  German  idealists,  to  show  that  they  regarded 
the  explanation  of  perception  by  causality  as  being  a  criterion 
distinguishing  realism  from  idealism.  Fichte  says  "The  true 
question  in  dispute  between  dogmatic  realism  and  dogmatic 
idealism  is,  therefore,  in  what  manner  shall  we  explain  repre- 
sentation? Through  the  conception  of  causality!  asserts 
realism.  Through  the  conception  of  substantiality!  asserts 
idealism."  *  By  substantiality  Fichte  means  to  indicate  the 
view  which  regards  the  non-Ego  as  possessing  no  reality  or 
efficiency  except  that  which  it  receives  from  the  Ego. 

But  a  further  examination  shows  that  we  cannot  satis- 
factorily distinguish  the  two  philosophical  tendencies  accord- 
ing as  they  do  or  do  not  explain  perception  by  the  causality 
of  something  external  to  the  percipient  mind.  For  in  the 
first  place,  upon  this  basis  even  Berkeley,  the  high-priest  of 
idealism,  would  figure  as  a  realist.  With  Leibniz,  also,  al- 

i  Fichte,   Science  of  Kmnrlcihii'.    Kroeger's  translation,  p.  133. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  i) 

though  our  perceptions  at  any  given  moment  arise  by  virtue  of 
the  spontaneity  of  the  mind,  they  all  trace  back  ultimately  to 
the  causality  of  God.  In  the  second  place,  the  real  import 
of  the  change  introduced  by  the  post-Kantian  idealism  con- 
sists not  in  the  fact  that  it  has  destroyed  the  conception  of 
a  causal  relation  obtaining  between  the  individual  mind  and 
its  environing  universe,  but  rather  in  the  fact  that  it  has  taken 
the  causal  conception  up  into  the  higher  idea  of  an  organic 
system.  It  is  true  that  the  relation  in  which  one  member 
of  this  system  stands  to  another  is  a  teleological  one,  by  virtue 
of  the  membership  of  all  individuals  in  the  common  plan; 
and  the  idealistic  theory  of  knowledge  is  therefore  concerned 
to  show  that  the  cognitive  relation  is  not  mechanical  simply, 
but  that  subject  and  object  mutually  imply  one  another 
within  the  teleological  unity  of  an  organic  whole.  Could  this 
be  successfully  denied,  I  judge  that  idealism  would  fail.  It 
is  necessary  to  show  that  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  its 
environing  universe  is  not  simply  mechanical,  barely  causal, 
but  that  it  is  teleological.  As  soon,  however,  as  \ve  have 
taken  the  causal  idea  up  into  this  higher  thought  of  syste- 
matic relation,  we  can  give  it  its  relative  truth.  Subject  and 
object,  or  rather  sensation  and  stimulus,  are  in  relations 
which  are  not  merely  causal,  in  the  pluralistic  or  mechanical 
sense;  it  does  not  follow,  however,  that  the  causal  judgment 
has  no  applicability  to  the  situation.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
may  as  fairly  be  applied  there  as  in  any  other  relation.  But 
in  any  relation  it  gives  only  an  abstract  and  superficial  ren- 
dering of  the  true  connection  of  individual  facts  within  a  uni- 
verse. '"The  truth  of  mechanism  is  teleology." 

According  to  the  modified  view  of  causality  now  under  dis- 
cussion, a  cause  does  not  act  directly  upon  its  effect,  but  the 
causal  action  is  mediated  through  the  world-ground.  It  is 
by  virtue  of  the  immanence  of  the  world-ground  in  the  object, 
and  by  its  free  activity,  rather  than  by  the  direct  transeunt 
action  of  the  mechanical  cause,  that  an  orderly  effect  issues. 


10  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

Perceptions  arise  in  the  mind,  then,  not  by  the  direct  causal 
action  of  objects,  but  by  the  ideal  immanence  in  the  mind 
of  the  world-ground  as  absolute  Ego.  But  as  this  is  what  all 
causal  action  really  implies,  we  are  as  well  justified  in  saying 
that  our  perceptions  are  caused  by  something  other  than  the 
mind  as  in  saying  that  physical  changes  are  caused  by  other 
physical  changes.  The  refusal  of  German  idealism  to  explain 
perception  by  means  of  causality,  then,  amounts  to  no  more 
than  an  assertion  that  all  such  causal  action  must  take  place 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  one  all-comprehending  world-ground 
and  must  be  guided  and  controlled  at  every  turn  by  the  spon 
taneity  of  this  absolute  Spirit. 

Having  rejected  as  unsatisfactory  criteria  of  idealism  both 
the  denial  of  an  external  world  and  the  denial  of  a  causal  re- 
lation between  the  finite  mind  and  the  universe,  it  is  necessary 
to  go  deeper  in  order  to  discover  its  essential  marks. 

Idealism  can  best  be  characterized,  I  think,  by  subordinat- 
ing the  purely  epistemological  standpoint  to  the  metaphysical 
one.  Dropping  for  the  moment  the  question  of  the  origin  of 
perceptions,  we  should  ask  what  sort  of  a  world-principle  ideal- 
ism contemplates.  The  essential  divergence  from  realism,  and 
the  grounds  for  the  epistemological  theses  will  then  appear  in 
(heir  proper  correlation. 

Idealism  is  convinced,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  world  is 
Ilie  production  of  a  unitary  principle;  a  principle,  moreover, 
which  in  a  systematic  and  orderly  way  bears  upon  its  bosom  a 
vast  multiplicity  of  detail,  This  idea  of  systematic  unity  finds 
its  best  analogical  expression  in  the  conception  of  an  organ- 
ism. The  world  is  an  organic  unity,  in  such  wise  that  the  ideal 
of  the  whole  is  immanent  in  every  part.  It  is  true  that  the 
analogy  of  an  organism,  if  taken  with  utmost  strictness,  must 
after  a  time  break  down,  but  it  serves  to  illustrate  in  some 
degree  the  relation  which  individuals  can  bear  towards  an  ideal 
system-founding  universal.  It  is  only  when  we  study  the 
deeper  implications  of  the  mind-life  that  we  find  this  relation- 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  11 

ship  displayed  in  a  war  which  is  more  than  analogical  and 
which  does  not  break  down  when  applied  to  the  Real.  The 
world  is  a  system-bearing  unity,  then,  to  which  the  deeper  re- 
lations found  in  the  mind-life  furnish  the  key.  This  monistic 
bent  is  both  logically  and  historically  involved  in  idealism 
as  a  philosophical  tendency.  A  pluralism  which  admits  no 
higher  unity  within  the  sphere  of  a  Being  which  is  truly  one 
cannot  claim  to  be  an  idealism.  Against  such 'a  view  we  find 
the  idealist  arguing  that  absolutely  discrete  entities  cannot 
interact,  and  that  therefore  no  universe  can  be  formed  by 
pluralism.  And  since  they  cannot  interact,  they  cannot  act 
causally  upon  the  mind.  It  follows  that  even  if  a  multitude 
of  discrete  elements  existed  we  could  not  know  it. 

The  philosophy  of  Leibniz  illustrates  the  significance  of  the 
conception  of  an  immanent  totalizing  ideal  to  which  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  world  forces  and  the  orderliness  of  nature  are 
referred.  For  Leibniz,  the  possibility  of  interaction  between 
monads  depended  upon  the  creating  and  adjusting  power  of 
God,  Only  because  God  ordains  that  two  monads  shall  act 
in  unison  do  they  exhibit  the  relations  which  we  refer  to  in- 
teraction. In  fact,  however,  no  dynamical  relations  exist  be- 
tween the  two.  Leibniz  holds,  it  is  true,  that  the  apparent 
interaction  has  been  preestablished  for  all  time,  and  that  the 
further  mediation  of  God  is  no  longer  necessary  in  the  sense 
in  which  it  was  required  at  the  beginning.  This  point,  how- 
ever, is  not  essential  to  the  present  reflection.  The  important 
consideration  is  that  the  monads,  regarded  as  independent 
entities,  cannot  influence  one  another,  and  the  possibility  of 
forming  them  into  a  universe  depends  upon  the  all-including 
monad.  God.  The  philosophy  of  Leibniz  is  therefore,  so  far 
as  this  criterion  goes,  a  true  idealism.  But  the  preestablish- 
ment  at  the  creation  of  all  causal  events  proved  too  ygorous 
:i  doctrine  for  his  successors.  Accordingly,  they  admitted  a 
Iruly  dynamical  interaction  between  the  monads,  an  influence 
not  mediated  by  Divine  assistance.  God  became,  then,  a 


12  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

necessity  of  thought,  an  Ens  rationis,  even  an  Ens  rcalissun  inn., 
Imt  no  longer  a  concrete  postulate  to  make  possible  physical 
change.  Banished  into  the  region  of  abstractions,  with  the 
world  progressing  successfully  without  him,  the  very  existence 
of  God  came  into  serious  question.  Thus  the  transition  was 
made  from  the  idealism  of  Leibniz  to  the  dogmatic  realism 
"which  preceded  Kant,  merely  by  denying  that  interaction  is 
mediated  by  the  ideal  influence  of  a  monistic  world-principle. 
The  same  presupposition  is  essential  to  the  argument  of 
TTichte  and  Schelling.  The  explanation  of  perception  by  ex- 
ternal causation  they  hold  to  be  impossible.  One  could  admit 
that  the  problem  of  knowledge  cannot  be  solved  by  reducing 
cognition  to  a  result  of  physical  stimulation,  but  it  is  not  so 
clear  that  no  determinations  of  perception  can  be  due  to  the 
way  in  which  real  things  might  act  upon  us.  Upon  careful 
search,  however,  we  find  the  explanation  of  their  thought  in 
the  repeated  recurrence  of  passages  like  the  following:  "But 
further,  these  two  activities  [of  the  subject  and  of  the  object] 
cannot  be  absolutely  opposed  to  one  another,  unless  they  are 
activities  of  one  and  the  same  identical  subject.  They  cannot 
therefore  be  united  in  one  and  the  same  product,  without  a 
third  which  is  the  synthesis  of  the  two."  1  The  possibility  of 
bringing  together  the  finite  Ego  and  the  non-Ego,  and  of  allow- 
ing them  to  mutually  determine  one  another,  rests  upon  the 
fact  that  the  two  are  united  within  the  absolute  Ego.  And 
in  fact  this  is  nothing  more  or  less  than  the  central  doctrine 
of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  that  all  science  rests  upon 
synthesis  and  all  synthesis  is  within  the  transcendental  unity 
of  the  constitutive  category.  All  post-Kantian  idealism,  then, 
is  foreordained  to  monism.  A  similar  effect  is  produced  in 
the  Greek  idealism  by  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  the  concept. 
Berkeleianism  is  less  developed  in  this  respect,  and  has  not 
thought  out  deeply  the  relations  in  which  the  individual  mind 
•stands  to  the  world-ground.  It  has  therefore  failed  to  catch 

1  Schelling,  S&nimtlicJic  Wcrkc,  Abth.  I,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  440. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  13 

the  genuine  logic  of  constructive  idealism.  Its  argument  for 
the  mutual  correlation  of  subject  and  object  has  put  it  upon 
a  course,  however,  which  justifies  us  in  classifying  it  as  ideal- 
ism, although  crude  and  undeveloped. 

Upon  the  criterion  here  defended  all  forms  of  pluralism,, 
however  much  they  may  insist  that  their  plural  elements  are 
souls,  must  be  classed  as  realism.  Herbartian  metaphysics 
accepts  this  designation.  Lotze's  extension  of  the  Herbartian 
realism  consists  in  adding  to  it  the  very  feature  which  char- 
acterizes idealism,  and  is  therefore  a  radical  alteration. 

All  -idealism  is  monistic,  inspired  by  the  conception  of  a 
system-founding  whole  ideally  immanent  in  the  parts.  It  is. 
not  practicable  to  say,  of  course,  that  all  monism  is  idealistic, 
although  it  may  very  well  be  that  all  consistently  thought  out 
monism  which  attempts  to  define  the  conception  of  a  concrete 
or  system-founding  universal  will  be  so.  It  is  therefore  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  secure  a  completed  definition,  to  develop  the 
further  characteristics  of  idealism. 

Its  second  important  characteristic  consists  in  the  fact  that 
for  idealism  all  knowledge,  and  indeed  all  forms  of  apprehen- 
sion of  the  Real,  rest  upon  and  presuppose  idealization.  That 
is,  they  rest  upon  the  operation  within  the  finite  consciousness 
of  the  ideal  of  the  Universal,  the  Totality,  bringing  out  the 
orderliness  which  is  implied  within  experience.  The  content 
of  this  ideal  is  not  derived  by  copying  from  finite  sense  feeling,, 
but  rests  upon  the  autonomy  of  Mind  itself. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  how  this  element,  first  in- 
troduced into  philosophy  in  articulate  form  by  Plato,  has 
played  a  prominent  part  in  all  constructive  idealism.  Many 
forms  in  which  the  doctrine  has  been  cast  have  been  defective. 
Idealism  does  not  need  to  hold  to  an  a  priori  rational  knowl- 
edge apart  from  experience;  it  does  need  to  hold,  so  far  as  I 
can  see,  to  the  domination  of  an  ideal  universal  in  knowledge. 
Its  theory  of  knowledge,  then,  can  only  be  a  theory  of  the  way 
in  which  experience  implies  and  exhibits  the  operation  of  this 
dominant  universal. 


14  THE    PHYSICS    OB1    IDEALISM. 

It  is  more  important  to  point  out  the  connection  of  this 
epistemological  criterion  with  the  metaphysical  one  first  men- 
tioned. The  epistemological  doctrine  is  rendered  necessary,  if 
the  metaphysical  one  is  to  be  maintained,  because  only  through 
the  idealism  of  finite  consciousness  can  any  kno\vledge  be 
gained  of  a  totalizing  synthetic  Universal,  or  any  meaning  be 
given  to  the  conception.  If  all  cognitive  experience  testified 
only  of  contingent  phenomena,  of  physical  fa.cts  in  time  and 
space,  then  there  would  be  no  evidence  of  an  intelligible  unity 
in  the  world.  Indeed,  we  should  then  be  forced  to  say  that 
any  unity  which  might  exist  in  the  world  must  be  unintel- 
ligible. But  if  knowledge  involves  the  treatment  of  perceptual 
experience  in  the  light  of  an  ideal  of  unity  and  order  tran- 
scending perception,  then  all  cognitive  experience  testifies  to 
the  existence  of  spiritual  order  in  the  world.  Every  experience 
we  have,  every  fact  that  we  know,  is  so  much  experiental  tes- 
timony of  mind  in  the  world.  Unless  we  knew  God  we  should 
not  knowing  anything.  In  brief,  a  dominant  universal  in  the 
Avorld  carries  with  it  a  universal  operative  in  knowledge;  and 
the  establishment  of  the  universal  operative  in  knowledge  is 
the  ground,  and  the  only  rational  ground,  for  asserting  the 
dominant  universal  in  the  world. 

This  criterion  has  an  adverse  bearing  upon  any  idealism 
founded  upon  sensationalism.  The  essential  thing  about  sen- 
sationalism is  its  conception  of  thinking  as  copying  sense  data. 
The  resulting  denial  of  idealization  in  knowledge  precludes  the 
possibility  of  a  perfected  idealistic  system  on  this  basis,  and 
drove  Berkeley  in  his  later  years  to  Platonism. 

The  third  characteristic  mark  of  idealism  is  its  conviction 
that  the  ultimate  import  of  the  ideal  operating  in  the  finite 
consciousness  is  Reality  itself.  The  ideal  is  the  real,  if  you 
first  define  the  ideal  with  sufficient  breadth  and  depth.  The 
perfect  fruition  of  that  intellectual  and  ethical  idealization 
which  autonomously  reveals  itself  in  the  life  of  mind  gives  us 
our  only  intelligible  interpretation  of  the  category  of  Being 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  15 

or  Reality.  Throughout  all  our  intellectual  life  we  are  judging 
some  interpretations  of  experience  to  be  relatively  illogical 
and  false,  others  to  be  relatively  logical  and  true;  and  the 
basis  or  postulate  of  this  procedure  can  only  be  our  implicit 
recognition  that  Reality  must  be  a  coherent  whole,  such  as 
would  be  presented  in  a  perfectly  organized  and  totalized  ex- 
perience. By  the  very  meaning  of  the  category,  then.  Reality 
is  the  norm  of  the  mind.  This  conception  of  the  ontological 
predicate  we  are  in  fact  using  all  the  time,  and  we  have  no 
other  conception  of  it  which  can  be  analyzed,  defined,  or  freed 
from  contradiction  and  absurdity.  In  particular,  the  meaning 
of  the  ontological  predicate  cannot  be  found  in  the  sense  of 
pressure  or  resistance.  It  is  upon  this  point  that  the  idealistic 
polemic  against  mere  causality  becomes  in  order. 

It  is  clear  that  this  third  thesis  also  is  logically  bound  up 
with  the  fundamental  view-point  and  tendency  of  idealism. 
We  have  said  that  reality  is  an  organic  or  mind-like  unity: 
that  we  know  it  to  be  so,  because  in  every  act  of  knowledge  we 
are  led  by  an  organizing  ideal.  We  require  to  add  that  this 
ideal  presents  the  real ;  otherwise  our  argument  fails. 

Under  this  third  criterion  the  philosophy  of  Leibniz  falls 
somewhat  short  of  a  genuine  idealism.  It  infers  from  the  in- 
dividual monad  to  the  nature  of  other  monads  by  analogy, 
rather  than  by  the  recognition  of  identity  of  principle.  It  does 
not  say.  Reality  is  known  as  the  perfected  Principle  revealed 
in  the  idealism  of  my  individual  life.  It  says,  Reality  is  known 
as  like  my  individual  will.  It  is  true  that  the  organic  relation 
of  part  to  whole,  upon  which  the  system  of  Leibniz  turns, 
implies  a  deeper  thought;  but  so  far  as  thinkers  who  follow 
him  fall  back  upon  the  analogical  inference  from  the  individual 
to  the  transcendent  they  tend  to  lose  this  deeper  thought. 

The  three  criteria  here  developed  were  satisfied  by  Greek 
thought,  and  by  those  philosophical  developments  through  the 
ages  which  have  drawn  most  inspiration  from  Plato.  It  is 
only  in  the  speculation  which  followed  Kant,  however,  that  we 

/\*r 

V     OF  THE 

UNIV 


16  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

can  find  in  modern  times  a  satisfactory  and  relatively  inde- 
pendent development  of  idealism.  It  is  only  in  post-Kantian 
speculation,  and  especially  in  the  systems  of  Schelling  and 
Hegel  that  the  task  of  constructing  a  philosophy  of  natural 
science  upon  idealistic  lines  is  fairly  attacked.  The  success 
attained  in  this  field  has  not  generally  gained  a  high  rating. 
Subsequent  thought  has  made  some  advance  beyond  them,  but 
the  present  state  of  idealistic  Naturphilosophie  is  not  a  matter 
of  congratulation.  The  entire  course  of  thought  in  this  field 
has  been  largely  determined  by  Schelling,  and  it  is  chiefly  ta 
his  work,  especially  so  far  as  it  concerns  speculative  physics.. 
Hint  this  monograph  is  devoted. 


THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM.  17 


CHAPTER  I. 

KANT'S  METAPHYSIC  OF  NATURE. 

A.  Its  Significance  for  Idealistic  Speculative  Physics. 

A  discussion  of  the  problem  which  idealism  has  to  treat  in 
the  philosophy  of  physics  must  take  into  consideration  at  the 
beginning  the  doctrines  of  Kant  as  set  forth  in  his  work  on 
the  Metaphysical  Basis  of  the  Natural  Sciences.  It  is  true  that 
Kant  himself  is  not  a  thoroughgoing  and  consistent  idealist. 
For  the  metaphysic  of  nature,  at  any  rate,  the  reality  which 
lies  at  the  basis  of  the  material  world  is  unknown.  The 
Critical  Philosophy  is  doubtless  idealistic  in  spirit,  yet  it  wants 
many  of  the  characteristics  which  mark  a  genuine  idealism. 
It  may  seem  irrelevant,  then,  to  begin  a  study  of  idealistic 
Xaturphilosophie  with  a  discussion  of  Kant's  Metaphysic  of 
Nature. 

The  reasons  which  render  such  a  course  advisable,  however, 
are  cogent.  Kant  and  his  idealistic  successors  found  them- 
selves confronted  by  much  the  same  task.  For  both  the  ma- 
terial world,  as  a  world  of  independent,  self-existent  realities, 
had  vanished.  That  which  was  absolutely  real  bore  no  re- 
semblance to  the  matter  which  science  conceived.  The  task 
arose,  then,  of  explaining  how  the  appearance  of  a  material 
world  subordinate  to  law  should  be  maintained  when  nothing 
analogous  to  it  in  reality  existed.  For  the  performance  of  this 
task  the  differing  materials  supplied  by  the  different  systems 
of  metaphysics  would  suggest  different  methods.  Historically, 
however,  the  methods  adopted  w^ere  not  radically  different. 
The  main  features  of  Kant's  Metaphysical  Basis  of  the 
yatural  Sciences  were  adopted  with  slight  change  into  the 
NaturphHosophie  of  Schelling,  and  through  this  channel  its 

2 


18  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

influence  was  transmitted  to  subsequent  idealistic  speculation 
on  nature.  The  chief  task  of  Schelling  was,  not  to  improve 
upon  the  Kantian  doctrine,  but  to  work  out  more  clearly  its 
connection  with  idealistic  philosophy.  Much  was  added  by 
Schelling,  of  course,  but  the  spirit  of  the  whole  was  deter- 
mined by  Kant.  For  this  reason  an  examination  of  the  Meta- 
physical Basis  of  the  Natural  Sciences  must  form  the  begin- 
ning of  a  critical  discussion  of  the  subsequent  speculative 
physics. 

B.  Outline  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature. 

The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  had  shown  that  the  world  of 
experience  is  constituted  for  us  by  the  synthetic  activity  of  the 
transcendental  unity  of  apperception,  as  it  combines  the  mani- 
fold which  is  given  through  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  The 
material  world,  then,  must  depend  entirely  upon  the  applica- 
tion of  the  categories  of  the  understanding  to  the  manifold 
given  through  the  form  of  the  external  sense,  that  is,  in  space. 
We  are  led  to  expect,  therefore,  that  a  metaphysic  of  nature 
should  bring  the  phenomena  of  the  external  world  into  connecr 
tion  with  the  categories  of  the  understanding,  showing  spe- 
cifically what  part  each  category  plays  in  the  construction  of 
nature,  and  proving  that  on  this  hypothesis  the  material  world 
would  be  constituted  such  as  science  knows  it. 

It  is  doubtful  if  this  task  is  successfully  accomplished. 
Kant  does  attempt,  however,  to  bring  the  phenomena  into  con- 
nection with  the  categories  of  the  understanding.  This  is  ac- 
complished by  an  artificial  systematization  of  the  mode  of 
treatment.  Matter  is  considered  from  four  points  of  view, 
corresponding  to  the  four  classes  of  categories,  quantity,  qual- 
ity, relation,  and  modality.  Under  each  of  these  headings 
three  distinctions  are  made,  which  are  identified  with  the 
three  categories  of  the  corresponding  class.  Now,  since  the 
understanding  leads  all  other  predicates  pertaining  to  the 
nature  of  matter  back  to  the  one  predicate  of  motion,  which 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  19 

is  the  only  one  capable  of  affecting  the  senses,  natural  science 
is  throughout  a  doctrine  of  motion.  Therefore  the  first  of  the 
four  divisions,  phoronomy,  treats  of  motion  as  a  mere  quan- 
tum :  the  second,  dynamics,  treats  of  it  as  an  original  moving 
force  belonging  to  the  quality  of  matter;  the  third,  dynamics, 
deals  with  this  quality  as  by  its  own  reciprocal  motion  in 
relation;  the  fourth,  phenomenology,  considers  matter  with  its 
motion  as  phenomenon  of  the  external  sense,  or  in  reference  to 
modality.  In  considering  these  it  seems  better  to  neglect 
Kant's  order  of  treatment,  and  to  deal  at  once  with  the  second 
division,  dynamics,  which  forms  the  core  of  the  whole  doctrine. 

Matter,  for  dynamics,  is  the  movable  so  far  as  it  fills  space. 
To  fill  space  means  to  resist  everything  movable  which  en- 
deavors to  press  into  the  space  in  question.  This  involves 
the  capacity  of  offering  resistance,  a  capacity  which  is  related 
to  the  act  as  cause  to  effect.  Now,  what  is  this  property  upon 
which  depends  the  capacity  of  matter  to  offer  resistance? 
Some  hold  that  it  is  the  solidity  of  an  existent  substance,  and 
that  the  very  conception  of  such  solidity  carries  with  it  that 
of  resistance.  This,  however,  is  not  the  case.  Only  when 
there  is  attributed  to  that  which  occupies  space  a  power  of 
repelling  that  which  approaches  it  does  one  comprehend  how 
it  involves  a  contradiction  that  one  thing  should  penetrate 
into  the  space  occupied  by  another.  The  penetration  into 
space  is  a  motion.  It  is  diminished  or  destroyed  by 
resistance.  Nothing  can  diminish  or  destroy  motion  but  an- 
other motion  of  the  same  movable  in  the  opposite  direction. 
This  is  proved  in  the  phoronomv.  Matter  fills  space,  then,  by 
causing  another  motion  of  the  invading  movable  in  the  oppo- 
site direction.  Now  the  cause  of  motion  is  a  moving  force. 
Not.  therefore,  by  its  mere  existence,  but  by  a  special  moving 
force,  does  matter  occupy  space. 

Only  two  moving  forces  in  matter  can  be  conceived.  That 
by  means  of  which  a  body  may  be  the  cause  of  the  approach 
of  others  to  itself  is  attractive  force;  that  by  means  of  which 


20  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

it  may  be  the  cause  of  repelling  others  from  itself  is  repulsive 
force.  This  latter  is  a  force  of  expansion,  and  it  is  by  the 
repulsive  force  of  all  its  parts  that  matter  fills  space.  This 
repulsive  force  must  have  a  definite  degree,  beyond  which 
smaller  or  larger  degrees  can  be  conceived  to  infinity.  As 
expansive  force  is  elasticity,  all  matter  is  originally  and  essen- 
tially elastic.  Now  matter  can  be  compressed  to  infinity, 
because  a  force  able  to  overcome  its  expansion  can  always  be 
conceived;  but,  however  great  the  compressing  force,  it  can 
never  be  penetrated,  that  is,  the  space  of  its  extension  can 
never  be  entirely  abolished,  since  that  would  require  an  in- 
finite compressing  force,  an  impossibility.  The  expansive 
force  here  described  increases  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of 
compression,  and  the  impenetrability  resulting  may  be  called 
relative  impenetrability  resting  upon  the  dynamical  filling  of 
space.  The  mathematical  conception  of  impenetrability,  ac- 
cording to  which  matter  is  really  capable  of  no  compression 
at  all,  would  involve  absolute  impenetrability.  The  latter  is 
nothing  more  than  an  occult  quality.  If  we  ask  why  one  body 
cannot  be  penetrated  by  another,  the  only  answer  which  this 
view  gives  is,  because  it  was  impenetrable.  Repulsive  force, 
however,  does  afford  an  explanation,  since  it  gives  a  concep- 
tion of  an  actual  cause,  in  accordance  with  which  the  effect, 
resistance  in  space,  may  be  accurately  estimated. 

The  infinite  divisibility  of  matter  has  long  been  disputed. 
What,  on  the  dynamical  theory,  does  it  mean  to  say  that 
matter  is  divisible?  Matter,  that  which  is  for  itself  movable 
ill  space,  is  substance.  That  is,  it  is  the  subject  of  all  that  in 
space  which  can  be  counted  as  belonging  to  the  existence  of 
things.  Now,  to  decide  the  question  of  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  matter,  we  have  only  to  remember  that  matter  is  that  which 
fills  space  and  that  space  is  mathematically  divisible  to  in- 
finity. If  it  were  not  true  that  matter  by  its  expansive  force 
completely  fills  space,  that  no  parts  of  space  are  vacant,  the 
demonstration  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space  would  by 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  21 

no  means  establish  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter.  In  a 
space  filled  with  matter,  however,  every  part  contains  repul- 
sive force,  able  to  drive  back  and  move  to  a  distance  other 
forces.  Hence  every  part  of  space  filled  with  matter  is  mov- 
able in  itself,  and  consequently  separable  from  those  remain- 
ing, as  material  substance,  by  physical  division.  Therefore 
matter,  like  the  space  it  fills,  is  infinitely  divisible. 

This  conclusion  seems  to  be  at  issue  with  the  proof,  given 
in  the  discussion  of  the  second  antinomy  of  pure  reason,  that 
every  substance  in  the  world  must  consist  of  simple  parts. 
We  must  remember,  however,  that  the  matter  here  spoken 
of  is  nothing  by  itself,  and  is  real  only  in  relation  to  percep- 
tion. If  we  were  compelled  to  assert  that  matter  is  infinitely 
divided,  and  consists  in  itself  of  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  we 
should  be  in  difficulty.  What  we  said  was  that  matter  is  in- 
finitely divisible.  Divisibility,  however,  is  not  the  same  as 
dividedness.  Since  matter  exists  only  for  perception,  the 
division  of  matter  goes  only  so  far  as  we  have  actually  car- 
ried it. 

Now  it  is  by  virtue  of  a  repulsive  force  that  matter  fills 
space  and  possesses  elasticity  and  impenetrability.  This  force 
alone,  however,  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  matter.  A 
purely  repulsive  force  cannot  limit  itself,  nor  can  it  be  lim- 
ited by  space  alone.  By  repulsive  force  merely,  then,  matter 
could  be  held  within  no  bounds,  but  would  dissipate  itself  to 
infinity.  Another  force  is  required,  original  in  matter,  and 
working  in  the  opposite  direction  to  the  repulsive  force.  That 
is,  the  possibility  of  matter  requires  the  assumption  of  a  force 
of  attraction  as  its  second  essential  fundamental  force.  At- 
traction alone  could  never  render  matter  possible.  By  its 
action  the  distances  between  the  parts  of  matter  would  be 
lessened  to  zero;  that  is,  matter  would  vanish  in  a  mathe- 
matical point.  Thus  the  two  forces  of  attraction  and  repul- 
sion must  equally  be  assumed.  They  are  not,  however,  of 
equal  rank.  Repulsive  force  is  a  property  contained  in  the 


*><> 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 


conception  of  matter,  the  ground  of  impenetrability.  Attract- 
ive force  does  not  belong  to  matter  by  conception,  but  is  at- 
tributed by  inference.  The  reason  for  this  distinction  is  that 
the  conception  of  matter  involves  the  filling  of  space.  Now 
that  by  virtue  of  which  matter  fills  space  is  its  repulsive  force. 
The  action  of  attractive  force,  on  the  contrary,  is  to  annihilate 
matter  by  preventing  the  filling  of  space.  The  forces  of  at- 
traction and  repulsion  differ  not  only  in  the  direction,  but 
also  in  the  method  of  their  action.  Repulsion  acts  only  by 
physical  contact,  attraction  only  at  a  distance.  Physical 
contact  implies  not  only  mathematical  contact,  but  something 
more.  It  implies  a  dynamical  relation  of  the  repulsive  forces 
of  the  two  bodies.  It  is  the  reciprocal  action  of  repulsive 
forces  in  the  common  boundary  of  the  two  matters.  The  ac- 
tion of  the  attractive  force  essential  to  all  matter,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  never  by  contact,  but  is  an  immediate  effect  upon 
other  matter  through  empty  space. 

It  may  be  urged  against  the  idea  of  action  at  a  distance 
that  a  body  cannot  act  where  it  is  not.  Kant  replies  that 
everything  in  space  acts  upon  another  thing  in  space  where 
the  acting  thing  is  not.  Merely  by  acting  where  it  is  a  body 
cannot  move  another,  since  the  other  body  is  necessarily  ont- 
side  it.  To  deny  the  possibility  of  action  at  a  distance  .is  to 
assert  that  bodies  can  immediately  affect  one  another  only  by 
the  intervention  of  the  forces  of  impenetrability.  This  means 
either  that  repulsive  forces  are  the  only  ones  by  means  of 
which  matter  becomes  operative,  or  at  least  4hat  they  are 
the  necessary  condition  of  such  operation.  Both  assertions, 
however,  are  without  foundation. 

We  may  further  describe  repulsive  and  attractive  forces  as 
superficial  and  penetrative  respectively.  Repulsive  force  can- 
not move  any  distant  part  except  by  means  of  parts  lying  be- 
tween. It  is  merely  a  superficial  force.  Attractive  force,  on 
the  other  hand,  extends  itself  directly  through  the  universe 
to  infinity.  The  degree  of  attraction  is  indeed  diminished  by 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  23 

extent  of  space,  so  that  it  is  in  inverse  proportion  to  the 
square  of  the  distance,  but  it  is  never  reduced  to  zero.  The 
effect  of  this  universal  attraction  is  gravitation,  and  the  effort 
to  move  in  the  direction  of  the  greater  gravitation  is 
weight.  The  effect  of  the  repulsive  force  is  elasticity.  Elas- 
ticity and  weight,  then,  are  the  only  universal  characteristics 
of  matter  that  can  be  discovered  a  priori. 

Now  this  entire  doctrine  of  dynamics  must  be  brought  into 
connection  with  the  categories  of  quality.  These  categories 
are  those  of  reality,  negation,  and  limitation.  The  real  in 
space  is  its  filling  through  the  force  of  repulsion.  The  force 
of  attraction  is  opposed  to  the  space-filling  power,  and  is  there- 
fore in  respect  to  it  negative.  The  determination  of  the  degree 
of  the  filling  of  space  results  from  the  limitation  of  one  force 
by  the  other.  In  analyzing  matter  into  the  result  of  the  mu- 
tual limitation  of  these  two  forces,  then,  we  have  marked  out 
the  function  of  the  categories  of  quality  in  a  metaphysical 
dynamic. 

The  metaphysics  of  motion  must  next  be  considered.  In  the 
first  place  let  us  look  upon  matter  in  its  simplest  aspect,  as 
that  which  is  capable  of  motion  in  space.  In  thus  treating 
of  matter  under  the  categories  of  quality  merely,  we  abstract 
from  the  causal  connection  of  bodies  and  even  from  mass,, 
and  deal  only  with  motion  and  its  quantity.  The  task  of 
phoronomy  is  to  construct  the  quantitative  relations  of  motion 
as  determined  in  velocity  and  direction,  and  especially  in  the 
composition  of  motion. 

Matter  is  the  movable  in  space.  Space,  however,  may  be 
considered  from  two  points  of  view.  Space  which  is  movable 
is  relative,  that  in  which  all  motion  must  finally  be  conceived 
is  absolute.  Absolute  space  is  not  a  space-in-itself,  it  is  simply 
indeterminate  space  in  general,  within  which  every  relative 
space  can  be  assumed  as  moved.  Now  all  motion  which  is 
perceptible  is  merely  relative,  and  presupposes  a  larger  rel- 
ative space  in  which  the  smaller  space  is  moved.  Motion  i& 


24  THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM. 

merely  the  change  of  the  external  relations  of  a  thing  to  a 
given  space.  This  definition  makes  clear  the  relativity  of  mo- 
tion. It  is  indifferent  whether  we  say  that  a  body  moves  in 
one  direction  in  a  resting  space,  or  that  space  moves  in  an 
opposite  direction  while  the  body  remains  at  rest. 

The  problem  of  the  composition  of  motion  is  the  real  one 
of  phoronomy.  In  constructing  this  conception  one  presents 
a  priori  in  intuition  a  motion,  so  far  as  it  arises  from  two  or 
more  given  motions  united  in  one  movable.  Now,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principle  of  the  relativity  of  motion,  the  compo- 
sition of  two  motions  of  the  same  movable  can  be  presented 
only  if  one  of  them  is  presented  in  absolute  space,  while  in- 
stead of  the  other,  an  equivalent  motion  of  the  relative  space 
in  the  contrary  direction  is  presented.  There  are  three  cases 
of  the  composition  of  motion,  corresponding  to  the  three  cate- 
gories of  quantity.  The  first,  where  two  motions  in  the  same 
direction  and  on  the  same  line  are  compounded,  involves  unity 
of  line  and  direction.  The  second,  in  which  the  motions  take 
place  along  the  same  line  in  opposite  directions,  gives  plurality 
of  direction  in  the  same  line.  In  the  third  case  two  motions 
in  different  directions  along  lines  forming  an  angle  are  com- 
pounded into  a  motion  along  a  line  different  from  either  of 
the  others.  This  involves  totality  of  lines  and  directions. 

So  far  we  have  considered  motion  in  abstraction  from  the 
^actual  moving  forces  involved.  We  may  now  go  on  to  meta- 
physical mechanics,  which  takes  account  of  the  quantity  of 
^natter  and  of  motion,  and  of  the  relations  of  the  moving 
forces  of  matter.  In  form,  this  brings  the  conception  of 
matter  under  the  categories  of  relation.  The  quantity  of 
matter  is  the  sum  of  the  parts  of  a  body  which  are  movable 
in  a  given  space.  When  these  parts  act  together,  they  con- 
stitute a  mass.  The  quantity  of  motion,  for  mechanics,  is  the 
product  of  the  quantity  of  matter  multiplied  by  its  velocity. 
Now  the  only  measure  of  the  comparative  quantity  of  matter 
contained  in  two  bodies  is  the  comparative  quantity  of  mo- 
tion which  the  two  exhibit. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  25 

We  are  now  ready  to  lay  down  the  three  fundamental  laws 
of  mechanics.  The  first  asserts  that  in  all  physical  changes 
the  quantity  of  matter  remains  the  same.  It  has  been  shown 
in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  that  no  substance  can  arise  or 
be  annihilated,  and  here  we  need  only  point  out  what  con- 
stitutes substance  in  matter.  Now  the  movable  in  space  is  the 
ultimate  subject  of  all  the  attributes  of  matter.  The  sum  of 
its  parts,  therefore,  is  the  quantity  of  material  substance. 
Hence  the  increase  or  diminution  of  the  quantity  of  matter 
would  mean  the  creation  or  annihilation  of  substance,  and  is 
therefore  impossible. 

The  second  law  of  mechanics  is  that  every  change  of  matter 
has  an  external  cause.  General  metaphysics  proves  that  every 
change  has  a  cause,  and  it  only  remains  to  show  that  the 
cause  of  material  change  must  be  external.  Matter,  how- 
ever, is  the  object  of  the  external  sense,  and  therefore  is  sub- 
ject to  no  determinations  except  those  of  external  relation 
in  space.  Since,  then,  matter  has  no  internal  determinations, 
all  change  of  matter  is  based  upon  external  causes. 

In  like  manner  the  third  law  of  mechanics  depends  upon 
universal  metaphysics.  All  external  action  is  shown  by  meta- 
physics to  be  reciprocal  action.  The  third  law  is  that  action 
and  reaction  are  equal.  It  needs  to  be  proved,  then,  that  for 
mechanics  reciprocal  action  is  reaction.  Kant  proves  this  by 
the  relativity  of  motion  in  space.  It  is  indifferent  whether 
we  say  that  one  body  moves  towards  a  second  in  space,  or 
that  the  second  together  with  its  space  moves  towards  the 
first.  If  the  bodies  come  in  contact,  then,  the  impact  of  one 
will  involve  an  equal  opposed  impact  on  the  part  of  the  other. 

These  three  laws,  of  permanence,  inertia,  and  reaction,  ex- 
actly correspond  to  the  categories  of  substance,  causality,  and 
community,  the  three  categories  of  relation. 

The  sphere  of  the  categories  of  modality  has  not  yet  been 
explained.  This  is  done  in  the  phenomenology,  in  which  mat- 
ter is  considered  as  an  object  of  possible  experience.  The 


26 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 


rectilinear  motion  of  a  body  is  a  merety  possible  predicate. 
This  is  true  because  motion  is  relative  and  the  moving  body 
may  with  equal  truth  be  regarded  as  resting,  if  we  look  upon 
its  surrounding  space  as  moving  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Absolute  motion  is  impossible.  Circular  motion,  however,  in- 
volves a  constant  play  of..new  forces  such  as  rectilinear  motion 
does  not,  and  must  therefore  be  admitted  as  a  real  predicate 
of  matter.  Again,  if  one  body  is  moving  in  comparison  with 
another,  an  equal  opposite  motion  of  the  latter  is  necessary. 
Metaphysics  can  do  no  more  than  this,  either  in  grounding 
a  general  theory  of  matter,  or  in  explaining  the  basis  of 
physical  science.  The  further  determinations  and  behavior 
of  matter  must  be  traced  out  by  empirical  research. 

C.  Critical  Analysis. 

The  general  favor  with  which  the  theory  of  matter  set 
forth  in  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature  has  been  received  by  ideal- 
ists indicates  that  it  can  be  readily  assimilated  to  the  thought 
of  an  idealistic  philosophy.  It  is  actually  found,  however, 
in  connection  with  a  system  far  removed  from  thorough-going 
idealism.  The  presumption  would  arise  that  it  logically  be- 
longs in  Kantian  moorings,  and  that  its  appropriation  by 
later  speculators  was  not  rationally  justified.  If  this  doc- 
trine issues  from  the  phenomenalism  of  the  Critique,  how  can 
it  be  preserved  and  even  amplified  by  thinkers  who  hold  that 
perfect  science  reveals  reality? 

But  is  the  presumption  well  grounded?  Does  Kant's  Meta- 
physic of  Nature  results  from  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason? 
Is  it  even  consistent  with  the  Critique? 

This  discussion,  then,  does  not  at  present  concern  the  tena- 
bility  and  value  of  the  views  set  forth  in  the  Metaphysic  of 
Nature.  Let  it  be  as  valuable  as  Kant  supposed.  In  the 
first  preface  of  the  Critique  he  says  that  he  hopes  to  produce 
a  system  of  pure  speculative  reason  under  the  title  of  Meta- 
physic of  Nature.  "It  will  not  be  half  so  large,  yet  in- 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  27 

finitely  richer  than  this  Critique  of  Pure  Reason/'  Accepting 
provisionally  this  evaluation,  the  question  arises,  Is  it 
Kantian? 

Let  us  deal  first  with  the  favorable  presumption  which  is 
established  by  the  apparent  deduction  of  this  speculative  phi- 
losophy of  nature  from  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  In  the 
preface  referred  to,  Kant  speaks  of  this  work  as  the  carrying 
out  to  completeness  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Critique,  "a  com- 
pleteness rendered  not  only  possible,  but  necessary,  through 
the  perfect  unity  of  this  kind  of  knowledge  all  derived  from 
pure  concepts,  without  any  influence  from  experience,  or 
from  special  intuitions  leading  to  a  definite  kind  of  experience, 
that  might  serve  to  enlarge  and  increase  it."  *  Within  the 
work  itself  he  repeatedly  speaks  in  such  a  manner  as  to  im- 
ply that  he  is  merely  applying  the  principles  of  metaphysics, 
and  that  no  characteristic  of  matter  which  is  not  knowable 
a  priori  falls  within  the  compass  of  the  investigation.  Thus, 
in  the  preface  we  find  him  saying,  "It  may  serve  as  a  second 
ground  for  gauging  this  procedure  that  in  all  that  is  called 
metaphysics  the  absolute  completeness  of  the  sciences  may  be 
hoped  for,  in  such  a  manner  as  can  be  promised  by  no  other 
species  of  knowledge,  and  therefore,  just  as  in  the  Metaphysic 
of  Nature  generally,  so  here  also  the  completeness  of  corporeal 
nature  may  be  confidently  expected;  the  reason  being  that  in 
metaphysics  the  object  is  considered  merely  according  to  the 
universal  laws  of  thought,  but  in  other  sciences  as  it  must  be 
presented  according  to  the  data  of  perception  (empirical  as 
well  as  pure) .  *  *  *  This  metaphysical  corporeal  doctrine 
I  believe  myself  to  have  completely  exhausted,  so  far  as  it 
reaches,  but  do  not  affect  thereby  to  have  achieved  any  great 
work."2 

Kant,  then,  wished  to  have  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature  re- 
garded as  deduced  a  priori  from  his  philosophy.  That  it  is 

1  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Max  Muller's  translation,  vol.  II,  p. 
xxix. 

2  Kant,  WerJce,  ed.  Rosenkranz,  vol.  V,  p.  313. 


28  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

accepted  in  this  light,  the  following  quotation  from  Professor 
Watson  will  show:  "Kant,  however,  has  a  special  treatise  in 
which  he  sets  forth  the  metaphysical  principles  of  the  science 
of  nature,  showing  how  intelligence,  as  operating  upon  the 
manifold  of  sense,  gives  rise  to  the  world  of  matter.  *  *  * 
The  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  then,  contains  those  prin- 
ciples which  are  the  product  of  the  schematized  categories  as 
applied  to  a  definite  manifold  of  sense,  the  material  world. 
*  *  *  It  is  practically  the  concrete  for  the  abstract  of  the 
Critique." 

Kant  reinforces  this  opinion  by  his  obvious  attempt  to  bring 
the  teaching  of  the  smaller  work  into  connection  with  the 
categories  of  the  understanding.  The  table  of  categories  seems 
to  determine  the  form  and  treatment  of  the  entire  discussion. 
The  division  of  the  work  corresponds  with  the  classes  of  cat- 
egories, and  within  each  division  it  is  pointed  out  that  the 
entire  teaching  of  that  division  is  in  reality  nothing  but  the 
marking  out  of  the  function  of  the  three  categories  involved. 
The  form  of  the  work  itself,  then,  indicates  the  closest  possible 
dependence  upon  the  Critique. 

In  fact,  however,  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  Meta- 
physic of  Nature  is  by  no  means  dependent  upon  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason.  It  was  reached  independently  of  the  Critique, 
and  before  Kant  even  dreamed  of  the  Copernican  revolution 
in  philosophy.  It  was  reached  from  the  standpoint  of  a  philos- 
ophy the  overthrow  of  which  was  one  of  the  purposes  of  the 
Critique.  It  disregards  some  of  the  most  central  teachings 
of  the  Critique,  and  is  flatly  contradictory  towards  others. 

The  most  important  portion  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature 
is  unquestionably  the  second  part,  dynamics,  which  explains 
matter  as  the  product  of  the  opposite  forces  of  attraction  and 
repulsion.  Now  the  date  of  this  work  [1786],  five  years  after 
the  first  edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  one  year  be- 
fore the  second  edition,  and  three  years  after  the  Prolegomena, 

1  Watson,  Kant  and  his  English  Critics,  p.  237. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  29 

gives  reason  to  believe  that  the  views  which  it  contains  are 
fully  in  harmony  with  the  speculations  of  the  critical  period. 
Bax  says,  "Written  in  1786,  just  one  year  before  the  publica- 
tion of  the  second  edition  of  the  Critique,  it  belongs  to  the 
maturest  period  of  Kant's  philosophical  activity."  If  we  take 
account  of  the  earlier  works  of  Kant,  however,  the  presump- 
tion that  the  principles  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  guided  in 
working  out  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature  is  greatly  shaken. 

In  this  connection  the  most  important  is  the  Monadologia 
Plujsica.  written  in  1756.  This  work  rests  in  general  upon 
the  post-Leibnitzian  metaphysics.  Starting  from  the  doctrine 
that  bodies  consist  of  monads,  simple  substances  which  can 
exist  in  isolation  one  from  another,  the  first  part  is  devoted 
to  a  demonstration  that  the  existence  of  physical  monads  is 
consistent  with  geometry.  The  second  part  explains  further 
the  most  general  characteristics  of  physical  monads,  and  how 
they  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  bodies. 
In  the  first  part  Kant  urges  [Prop.  VI]  that  a  monad  marks 
off  the  small  space  of  its  presence  not  through  a  plurality  of 
real  parts,  but  through  the  circle  of  its  activities  by  which  it 
restrains  the  monads  everywhere  present  without  it  from 
approaching  closer  to  itself.  One  is  to  look  for  the  ground  of 
the  filling  of  space,  he  says,  not  in  the  mere  existence  of  the 
substance,  but  in  an  activity  which  the  monad  exerts  out- 
wardly in  all  directions.  This  view  is  identical  with  the  one 
supported  in  the  dynamics,  and  is  supported  by  the  same  ar- 
guments. Here,  however,  it  is  explicit  that  the  monad  is 
simple  and  indivisible,  while  in  the  dynamics  the  parts  of 
matter  are  supposed  to  be  at  least  capable  of  farther  division. 

In  Prop.  VIII  Kant  shows  that  the  force  by  which  a  body 
fills  space  is  the  force  which  results  in  impenetrability.  Elas- 
ticity is  also  elplained  from  this  same  force,  in  the  same 
way  as  in  the  later  work.  The  force  of  expansion  has  a  definite 
degree,  which  may  always  be  exceeded  by  other  forces.  Since, 
however,  by  compression  the  repulsive  force  becomes  stronger, 


30  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

it  is  clear  that  by  no  conceivable  force  can  the  element  be 
thoroughty  penetrated.  The  Metaphysical  Basis  of  the  Nat- 
ural Sciences  adds  nothing  to  this  handling  of  impenetrability 
and  elasticity. 

Prop.  X  of  the  Monadologia  Physica  shows  that  repulsive 
force  alone  cannot  constitute  matter,  since  by  repulsion  mat- 
ter would  be  held  to  no  definite  bounds,  but  would  dissipate 
itself  to  infinity.  An  equally  original  attractive  force  must 
therefore  be  assumed.  Kant  then  develops  the  relations  of 
these  two  opposed  forces,  and  the  physical  conceptions 
grounded  by  each,  in  a  manner  precisely  similar  to  that  which 
he  employed  later  when  writing  the  dynamics. 

The  divisibility  of  matter,  however,  is  treated  somewhat 
differently  in  the  two  works.  The  Monadologia  Physica  op- 
poses the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter,  holding  that  matter 
consists  of  simple  parts,  that  is,  of  monads.  The  later  work 
maintains  that  matter  is  infinitely  divisible,  but  not  in- 
finitely divided.  In  this  respect  the  influence  of  the  Critique 
is  apparent. 

In  the  first  division  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  the 
phoronomy,  the  composition  of  motion,  is  explained  by  means 
of  the  relativity  of  motion.  It  would  perhaps  seem  that  Kant 
in  maintaining  this  position  was  influenced  by  the  results 
of  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic.  If  space  as  known  is  simply 
a  relational  form,  and  in  no  wise  a  thing-in-itself,  the  doctrine 
of  relativity  would  seem  to  issue.  Certainly  Kant  makes  large 
use  of  this  idea.  It  is  developed  in  the  phoronomy,  and  there 
applied  to  the  composition  of  motion.  In  the  mechanics  it  is 
again  brought  in  to  explain  the  necessity  of  equality  in  action 
and  reaction.  Again,  the  whole  of  the  fourth  division  rests 
upon  the  relativity  of  motion.  Now  in  the  Monadologia  Phys* 
ica  nothing  is  found  of  this  principle.  Two  years  later,  how- 
ever, in  1758,  Kant  published  an  essay  entitled  A  New  Doc- 
trine of  Motion  and  Rest.  In  this  he  developed  very  fully 
the  idea  that  all  motion  of  a  body  in  space  may  with  equal 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  31 

propriety  be  regarded  as  the  motion  of  a  relative  space  while 
the  body  really  rests.  Motion  and  rest,  he  urges,  are  terms 
which  can  never  be  used  in  an  absolute  sense,  but  only  in  a 
relative  one.  This  is  the  same  doctrine  of  motion  as  occurs 
in  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature.  In  the  latter  work,  however, 
the  conception  of  rest  is  more  fully  developed.  Rest,  it  is 
urged,  is  to  be  conceived,  not  as  a  lack  of  motion,  but  rather 
as  lasting  presence  in  the  same  place,  in  one  set  of  relations. 
If  it  is  so  conceived,  we  may  hold  that  the  body  called  at  rest 
is  really  in  motion  with  an  infinitely  small  velocity.  The  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  from  such  a  conception  is  that  it  falls 
into  line  with  the  principle  of  continuity,  and  enables  us  to 
pass  gradually  from  motion  to  rest.  Mathematical  analogies 
strongly  motivate  this  conception.  It  had  not  been  fully 
reached  and  stated  at  the  time  of  the  essay  on  Motion  and 
Rest,,  but  the  arguments  which  go  to  develop  it  are  already 
there.  Kant  urges  that  if  the  law  of  continuity  is  to  hold, 
and  if  rest  is  defined  as  the  absence  of  motion,  one  body  can 
never  take  effect  upon  another,  for  the  reason  that  the  begin- 
ning of  motion,  involving  as  it  does  a  definite  velocity  suddenly 
added  to  the  body,  would  break  the  law  of  continuity.  This 
difficulty,  which  Kant  later  solves  by  defining  rest  as  perma- 
nent presence  in  the  same  place,  involving  infinitesimal  mo- 
tion, he  avoids  in  the  essay  by  casting  some  reflections  on  the 
law  of  continuity.  The  theory  of  rest,  then,  advanced  in  1758, 
is  not  quite  the  same  as  that  propounded  in  1785.  In  the 
former  discussion,  however,  Kant  had  already  arrived  at  the 
dilemma,  the  solution  of  which  resulted  in  the  later  doctrine. 
It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  doctrine  of  rest,  as  stated  in  the 
Metaphysic  of  Nature,  was  reached  independently  of  the 
Critical  Philosophy. 

I  have  shown  that  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  motion 
as  worked  out  in  the  phoronomy  had  been  elaborated  by  Kant 
twenty-eight  years  before.  The  most  important  use  which  he 
makes  of  this  doctrine  is  to  aid  him  in  deriving  a  priori  the 


32  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

law  of  mechanics  that  action  and  reaction  are  equal.  It  is 
in  the  attempted  proof  of  this  law  that  the  third  division  of 
the  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  the  mechanics,  makes  its  only  im- 
portant addition  to  the  Analogies  of  Experience  in  the  Cri- 
tique of  Pure  Reason.  Borrowing  from  general  metaphysics 
the  statement  that  all  external  action  is  reciprocal  action,  the 
Metaphysics  of  Nature  has  to  prove  only  that  this  reciprocal 
action  is  reaction — equal  and  opposed.  The  proof  rests  solely 
upon  the  relativity  of  motion.  Now,  in  the  essay  on  Motion 
and  Rest  this  same  proof  is  worked  out  as  one  of  the  conse- 
quences of  the  theory  published  in  1758.  The  a  priori  deduc- 
tion of  the  third  law  of  mechanics,  then,  was  gained  not  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  but  some  quarter 
of  a  century  before  the  critical  period. 

The  fourth  division  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  the 
phenomenology,  rests  almost  entirely  upon  the  relativity  of 
motion.  It  makes  one  addition,  by  way  of  correction,  to  the 
view  hitherto  expounded.  Circular  motion,  it  asserts,  is  to 
be  looked  upon  not  merely  as  relative,  but  as  real.  The  rea- 
son for  so  regarding  it  is  that  circular  motion  involves  a  con- 
stant play  of  forces  in  order  to  change  the  direction,  such  as 
rectilinear  motion  does  not.  It  is  not  apparent  at  what  time 
this  amendment  of  his  favorite  theory  of  the  relativity  of  mo- 
tion first  occurred  to  Kant.  Clearly,  however,  it  has  no  logical 
connection  with  the  Critique.  The  reason  for  asserting  that 
circular  motion  is  real  is  a  purely  physical  one.  Kant  is  in 
fact  indorsing  a  well-known  argument  of  Newton.  The  two 
remaining  propositions  of  the  phenomenology  are  mere  repeti- 
tions of  Kant's  theory  of  motion,  and  contain  nothing  new. 
They  are  added  here  only  to  fill  out  his  systematic  scheme. 
Indeed,  there  is  no  other  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  entire 
fourth  division,  the  phenomenology — a  fact  pointed  out  by 
Kirchmann  and  Adickes.1  It  contains  nothing  new,  and  noth- 
ing of  value  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Critical  Philosophy. 

1  Adickes,  Kant's  Systematic,  p.  130. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  33 

Let  us  now  briefly  summarize  the  results  of  our  examina- 
tion of  the  Metaphysical  Basis  of  the  Natural  Sciences.  Nearly 
the  whole  of  this  work  has  been  shown  to  be  a  restatement 
without  essential  change  of  positions  reached  decades  before 
the  critical  period.  The  contents  of  the  phoronomy,  which 
deals  with  motion,  rest,  and  the  composition  of  motions,  were 
stated  in  1758  in  a  form  which,  if  somewhat  less  developed, 
was  in  essentials  the  same.  There  is  nothing  in  this  division 
which  results  from  the  Critique;  and  if  we  except  the  allusion 
to  the  categories  with  which  the  section  ends,  no  effort  to 
bring  its  doctrines. into  harmony  with  the  Critique.  The  dyn- 
amics develops  the  idea  of  matter  as  the  product  of  two 
forces.  This  entire  doctrine  is  a  restatement  without  marked 
change  of  doctrines  expressed  in  the  Monadologia  Physica. 
It  contains,  however,  a  discussion  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of 
matter  which  is  due  in  part  to  the  Critique  and  opposed  to  the 
teaching  of  the  earlier  work.  The  mechanics  is  related  more 
closely  to  the  Critique  than  are  any  of  the  other  divisions. 
At  the  same  time,  it  contains  nothing  really  Kantian.  It 
assumes  the  validity  of  the  proofs  of  the  analogies  of  expe- 
rience, given  in  the  Critique.  To  deduce  the  laws  of  motion 
becomes  then  an  easy  matter;  the  work  had  really  been  done 
in  the  Critique.  The  proof  of  the  third  law,  however,  required 
some  additional  effort,  and  here  Kant  availed  himself  of  a 
demonstration  worked  out  in  1758.  The  phenomenology,  as 
has  already  been  remarked,  contains  nothing  of  importance. 

The  wholly  artificial  character  of  the  reference  of  these 
principles  to  the  categories  of  the  understanding  is  through- 
out clearly  apparent.  We  have  only  to  remember  what  the 
categories  really  are.  They  are  functions  of  the  understand- 
ing operative  in  constructing  and  determining  individual  ob- 
jects. They  issue  in  the  predicates  which  the  understanding 
applies  to  things.  In  order  to  know  a  single  object  fully  we 
have  to  recognize  its  predicates  under  each  of  the  several 
categories  which  determine  its  objectivity.  The  categories  are 
3 


34  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

active,  then,  not  merely  in  the  objective  world  as  a  whole,  but 
in  every  object  of  that  world,  and  several  categories  are  ap- 
plied to  each  object.  Now  the  applications  of  them  which 
Kant  here  makes  are  often  absurd.  The  categories  of  modality 
seem  to  have  exhausted  their  usefulness  in  the  apprehension  of 
nature  when  they  have  informed  us  that  one  kind  of  motion  is 
possible,  another  real,  and  a  third  necessary.  Unity,  plurality, 
and  totality  busy  themselves  with  the  task  of  informing  us 
that  if  two  bodies  move  along  the  same  line  in  the  same  direc- 
tion unity  is  involved,  if  in  opposite  directions  plurality, 
while  if  on  different  lines  totality  of  lines  and  directions  can 
be  predicated. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  work  which  the  categories  really  per- 
form, according  to  a  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  is  not 
that  for  which  he  is  here  using  them.  The  application  which 
he  is  here  making  of  the  table  of  the  categories  is  only  another 
manifestation  of  his  well-known  desire  to  systematize.  Dr. 
Adickes,  in  his  study  on  Kant's  Systematic,  has  made  an 
analysis  of  the  present  work  from  this  standpoint.  In  it  he 
lops  off  a  large  number  of  captions  which  were  added  by 
Kant  for  no  other  reason  than  to  fill  out  his  scheme.  The 
phoronomy,  which  we  treated  after  the  dynamics,  was  placed 
first  by  Kant  for  this  reason.  It  really  contains,  as  Adickes 
points  out,  nothing  but  the  doctrine  of  motion  and  rest,  and 
of  compound  motion.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  unity, 
plurality,  or  totality.  Concerning  the  dynamics,  Adickes  says 
"It  is  completely  arbitrary  when  he  brings  the  forces  of  at- 
traction and  repulsion  into  connection  with  the  categories  of 
reality  and  negation."  *  Besides,  this  does  not  contain  the  whole 
of  the  dynamics,  as  it  takes  no  account  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
divisibility  of  matter,  the  only  constituent  derived  from  the 
Critique.  Concerning  the  fourth  division,  the  phenomenology, 
Adickes  justly  holds  that  it  is  added  solely  for  the  sake  of  the 
scheme.  Although  it  purports  to  consider  matter  "merely  in 

1  Adickes,  Kant's  Systematik,  p.  126. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  35 

relation  to  the  mode  of  presentation,  or  modality,  and  there- 
fore as  a  phenomenon  of  the  outer  sense,''  matter  has  already 
been  regarded  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  outer  sense. 

"Let  us  eliminate,"  says  Adickes,  "what  was  taken  in  only 
on  account  of  the  system;  that  is,  from  the  mechanics  the 
first  and  second  mechanical  laws,  from  the  phenomenology 
the  first  and  third  propositions.  As  the  most  important  con- 
tents we  then  have  left : 

"First  division :  Doctrine  of  motion  and  rest  and  especially 
of  compound  motions. 

"Second  division:  Doctrine  of  the  essence  of  matter  (orig- 
inal forces  and  divisibility  I . 

"Third  division:  Doctrine  of  the  estimation  of  the  quantity 
of  matter,  of  the  equality  of  action  and  reaction. 

"Fourth  division :    Doctrine  of  circular  motion." 

This  analysis  seems  to  me  well  judged.  If  we  now  elimi- 
nate also  what  is  precritical  and  what  has  no  reference  to 
the  Critique  we  lose  all  that  remains  of  the  first  division,  since 
it  was  contained  in  the  earlier  essay  on  Motion  and  Rest:  we 
lose  the  second  division  with  the  exception  of  the  discussion 
of  divisibility;  we  lose  the  third  division,  since  the  estima- 
tion of  matter  is  discussed  without  reference  to  the  Critique, 
and  the  equality  of  action  and  reaction  is  proved  as  it  was 
twenty-seven  years  before;  and  we  lose  the  fourth  division, 
since  the  sop  to  Copernican  astronomy  contained  in  the  doc- 
trine of  circular  motion  has  no  reference  to  transcendantal 
philosophy.  Sum  total — the  only  important  respect  in  which 
the  Metaphysic  of  Nature  applies  the  ideas  of  Kantian  phi- 
losophy is  in  maintaining  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter. 

These  historical  considerations  doubtless  serve  to  remove 
the  presumption  that  the  Met  a  physical  Basis  of  the  Natural 
Xri<-nces  is  an  application  of  transcendentalism  to  physical 
discussion.  At  the  same  time,  since  it  was  written  after  the 
Critical  philosophy  had  taken  form,  one  might  expect  it  to 
be  sufficiently  in  harmony  with  Kantian  principles  to  merit 
its  place  within  his  system. 


36  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

But  not  even  that  is  true.  The  difficulty  of  applying  the 
theory  of  nature  there  found  to  the  Kantian  view  of  the 
world  is  apparent  at  all  points.  The  Metaphysic  of  Nature 
presupposes  space  as  existing  independently  of  the  percipient 
niind.  As  soon  as  we  introduce  the  doctrine  of  the  subjec- 
tivity of  space,  the  conceptions  of  attractive  and  repulsive 
forces  lose  the  meaning  which  they  formerly  possessed.  A 
new  meaning  might  possibly  be  read  into  them — to  do  so,  in 
fact,  was  the  work  of  later  reflection  by  Fichte  and  Schelling; 
but  it  would  constitute  a  new  doctrine  which  would  supplant 
the  old.  Hegel  has  shown  that  Kant  does  not  make  clear  what 
are  these  forces  by  means  of  which  space  is  filled.  They  are 
not  brought  into  relation  with  the  knowing  mind,  but  appear 
to  belong  to  a  nature  which  exists  independently  of  the  mind. 
No  attempt  is  made  to  show  that  the  dualism  implied  in  such 
a  view  is  to  be  revised  in  favor  of  any  form  of  monism.  In 
fact  the  view  offered  by  Kant  goes  more  readily  with  what  he 
calls  dogmatic  realism  than  with  his  own  philosophy.  This 
is  due,  of  course,  to  the  fact  that  it  was  originally  developed 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  Wolffian  system,  before  Kant's 
historic  arousal  by  Hume  had  taken  place.  Lotze  says  con- 
cerning this  work :  "I  lament,  in  the  first  place,  the  gap  which 
separates  the  results  of  these  speculations  from  those  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  The  ideal  nature  of  space  which  is 
asserted  in  the  Critique  is  here  left  almost  out  of  account; 
the  construction  of  matter  is  attempted  exclusively  from  the 
ordinary  point  of  view,  according  to  which  there  is  a  real  ex- 
tension, and  there  must  be  activities  adapted  to  fill  it.  I 
lament  no  less  what  has  previously  been  observed  by  Hegel, 
viz.,  that  there  should  remain  so  much  uncertainty  as  to  the 
subject  to  which  the  activities  thus  manifesting  themselves  in 
space,  and  so  constituting  matter,  are  to  be  attributed."  1 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  whatever  richness  there  may  be  in 
the  Kantian  Metaphysic  of  Nature,  it  does  not  properly  be- 

1  Lotze,  Metaphysic,  section  178. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  37 

long  to  Kantianism  as  a  system.  Grown  in  a  soil  of  Wolffian 
realism  its  appropriation  and  logical  development  by  idealism 
furnishes  a  problem  for  later  thinkers  of  the  transcendentalist 
movement. 


38  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 


CHAPTER  II. 

SCHELLING'S  CONSTRUCTION   OF    MATTER. 

A.  Transition  to  Schilling. 

The  philosophical  revolution  which  Kant  had  begun  was 
carried  to  its  legitimate  completion  by  hands  more  resolute 
than  his.  Starting  from  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  and  the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Fichte  united  into  a  harmonious 
system  these  discordant  elements  of  the  Kantian  philosophy, 
and  cleared  the  whole  of  the  last  lingering  traces  of  dogmatic 
realism.  The  general  result  of  Kant's  work  had  been  to  show 
that  the  world,  so  far  as  consciousness  is  concerned,  is  the 
product  of  the  synthetic  activity  of  thought.  If  any  other 
principle  than  active  Reason  is  admitted  to  exist,  it  can  at 
any  rate  have  no  influence  on  the  world  we  know.  That  which 
really  maintains  the  world  is  the  activity  implied  in  thought, 
and  since  of  this  we  can  never  say  that  it  is,  but  only  that  it 
acts,  it  follows  that  the  world  with  its  permanence  cannot  be 
explained  as  the  manifestation  of  an  existent  substance.  The 
synthesis  of  Kant  overthrows  the  identity  of  Spinoza. 

But  if  the  world  is  the  creation  of  a  monistic  active  prin- 
ciple, it  remains  to  show  how  from  mere  activity  can  arise  a 
subject  and  object  in  knowledge,  morality  and  duty,  the 
permanence  of  matter,  and  the  laws  of  organic  and  inorganic 
Nature.  Fichte  devoted  himself  to  the  problems  of  knowledge 
and  of  ethics.  With  those  branches  of  the  philosophy  of  Kant 
which  concern  physical  nature  and  organic  life,  however,  he 
had  nothing  to  do.  He  believed  that  a  correct  understanding 
of  the  process  of  knowledge  demonstrated  that  the  questions 
of  natural  science  have  no  real  philosophical  interest.  If  na- 
ture is  only  the  creation  of  thought,  any  constancies  which 


THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM.  39 

may  be  discovered  in  things  prove  nothing  about  the  Absolute 
Spirit  which  could  not  already  be  shown  by  an  examination 
of  intelligence.  For  the  purposes  of  philosophy,  then,  the 
science  of  nature  can  add  nothing  to  the  truth  which  has  al- 
ready been  worked  out  by  the  science  of  knowledge. 

This  result,  however,  is  a  paradoxical  one.  The  body  of 
scientific  knowledge  is  too  vast  and  too  definite  to  allow  us  to 
believe  that  it  is  without  significance  for  speculation.  It  was 
this  impressiveness  of  nature,  with  her  numerous  and  vigorous 
sciences,  that  induced  Schelling  to  undertake  the  task  of 
working  out  the  philosophical  significance  of  the  laws  and 
phenomena  of  the  objective  world.  From  the  speculative 
standpoint  which  Schelling  at  the  time  occupied  such  a  task 
could  not  legitimately  be  proposed.  He  did  not  then  clearly 
see,  however,  what  he  afterward  so  strenuously  maintained,, 
that  the  Fichtean  philosophy  could  give  no  account  of  the 
meaning  of  nature.  Believing  that  the  Kantian  theories  of 
cognition  and  of  volition  had  received  their  true  elaboration 
at  the  hands  of  Fichte,  Schelling  was  impressed  with  the  neces- 
sity of  handling  in  the  same  spirit  the  discussion  of  those  sub- 
jects which  are  treated  in  the  Critique  of  Judgment  and  the 
Metaphysical  Basis  of  the  Xatural  Sciences. 

In  his  earlier  works  upon  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  then, 
the  connection  of  the  results  there  set  forth  with  transcen- 
dental idealism  was  not  clear.  The  attempt  to  explain  more 
thoroughly  this  connection  called  to  Schelling's  attention  the 
necessity  of  revising  the  metaphysical  principles  upon  which 
he  was  relying.  The  manner  in  which  this  revision  was  grad- 
ually carried  out,  in  the  course  of  the  publication  of  several 
important  works,  adds  greatly  to  the  difficulty  of  discussing 
Schelling.  The  difficulties  are  perhaps  less  annoying,  in  deal- 
ing with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Naturphttosophie, 
however,  than  in  any  other  part  of  his  system.  Schelling's 
opinions  were  subjected  to  continual  modification,  and  in  the 
sphere  of  more  detailed  scientific  explanation  one  theory  was 


40  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

often  discarded  for  another.  The  basal  principles  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  however,  were  maintained  throughout 
the  several  most  important  works  with  a  fair  degree  of  con- 
stancy, even  though  the  metaphysical  setting  changed.  Now 
it  is  the  underlying  principles  which  constitute  the  most 
valuable  part  of  the  Naturphilosophie.  Neither  by  tempera- 
ment nor  by  training  was  Schelling  fitted  for  discussing  the 
more  detailed  problems  of  science,  but  in  lining  out  the  essen- 
tial principles  of  an  idealistic  philosophy  of  natural  science 
his  work  has  determined  the  drift  of  subsequent  speculation 
and  has  a  lasting  significance. 

Our  study  of  Schelling  does  not  undertake  a  systematic  ex- 
position. •  It  rather  aims  to  analyze  in  a  critical  manner  the 
nature  of  the  problem  which  he  proposes,  so  far  as  it  is  re- 
lated to  fundamental  physical  ideas,  and  to  evaluate  the 
means  which  idealism  furnishes  for  coherent  and  illuminating 
thinking  of  this  type. 

B.  The  Metaphysical  Point  of  Departure  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Nature. 

In  his  earlier  years  Schelling  was  in  full  accord  with 
Fichte  on  all  questions  of  metaphysics,  and  his  writings  are 
among  the  clearest  and  ablest  expositions  of  the  Wissen- 
schaftslehre.  Prior  to  the  publication  of  the  Ideas  Toivards  a 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  there  is  only  one  point  upon  which  he 
had  made  a  significant  modification  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
master.  This  modification,  one  may  add,  was  not  so  much 
in  the  spirit  of  revision  as  of  development.  Fichte  had  started 
from  the  Ego,  a  principle  by  which  he  sought  to  unify  abso- 
lute spirit  and  the  finite  spirit.  The  Ego  is  not  with  Fichte 
the  Absolute,  it  is  not  God,  nor  yet  is  it  merely  the  subjective 
consciousness  of  the  knowing  finite  individual,  but  it  is  in  a 
sense  both. 

Fichte  had  himself  experienced  difficulty,  however,  in  keep- 
ing the  two  from  falling  apart.  A  large  part  of  the  difficulty 


UNIVERSITY 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  41 

of  the  WissenscJwftslehre  turns  upon  ambiguities  arising  from 
these  two  senses  in  which  the  word  Ego  is  used.  It  is  by  the 
more  explicit  recognition  and  statement  of  the  distinction  be- 
tween the  Absolute  Ego  and  the  finite  Ego  that  Schelling  first 
manifests  his  tendency  to  break  away  from  the  subjectivism 
of  his  teacher,  and  to  find  in  absolute  spirit  a  firmer  basis  for 
the  independence  of  nature  than  could  readily  be  conceded 
by  Fichte. 

If  we  take,  then,  the  standpoint  of  the  Absolute  Ego,  the 
true  standpoint  for  the  deepest  metaphysical  view  of  reality, 
we  are  obliged  to  recognize  that  spirit  is  the  only  true  ex- 
istence in  the  world.  The  finite  mind  which  cognizes  the 
objective  world  is  but  one  form  of  activity  of  the  deeper  lying 
and  more  universal  spiritual  principle.  In  the  finite  mind 
this  principle  comes  to  consciousness,  as  by  its  nature  it  must 
do,  but  it  is  independent  of  the  finite  mind.  The  same  abso- 
lute spirit  underlies  all  finite  minds,  and  becomes  conscious 
of  itself  in  the  self-consciousness  of  individuals.  It  underlies 
also,  however,  the  objective  world  of  which  the  individual  mind 
takes  cognizance.  Since  spirit  is  all  that  truly  is,  nature  can- 
not be  something  opposed  to  spirit  and  independent  of  it. 
Nature  may  very  well  be  independent  of  the  mind  of  man,  but 
it  must  be'  sustained  and  ever  produced  anew  by  the  universal 
spiritual  principle  from  which  it  derives  its  life  and  essence. 
But  just  as  the  knowing  mind  is  such  because  in  it  the  Ab- 
solute Ego  has  come  to  consciousness,  so  for  Schelling  the 
objective  world  is  real  and  material  because  in  it  the  Abso- 
lute Ego  is  not  conscious  of  its  activity.  Universal  Spirit  pro- 
duces the  world  of  nature,  but  produces  it  blindly,  without 
knowledge  that  it  is  producing  a  world.  Because  the  Absolute 
Ego  is  not  aware  of  its  agency  in  producing  and  maintaining 
nature,  when  it  comes  to  consciousness,  in  finite  minds,  it 
regards  nature  as  something  strange  to  it,  something  foreign, 
something  entirely  independent  of  mind.  In  other  words, 
nature  is  real.  This  is  the  reason  why  the  common  sense  of 


42  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

mankind  declares  the  objective  world  to  be  independent  of 
mind.  It  is  independent  of  any  conscious  mind,  but  not  in- 
dependent of  the  spiritual  principle  upon  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  that  mind  depends.  It  is  upon  this  fact  that  the  dis- 
tinction between  reality  and  ideality  is  founded.  Viewed  from 
the  highest  standpoint,  the  productivity  active  in  nature  is 
free,  it  is  an  activity  of  pure  spirit,  and  therefore  ideal.  But 
it  never  comes  to  consciousness  of  itself.  When  it  is  cog- 
nized, it  is  the  object  of  an  intelligence,  and  is  accordingly 
regarded  as  opposed  to  intelligence.  It  appears,  then,  no 
longer  as  free,  but  as  subjected  to  laws  of  necessity,  and 
devoid  of  mind.  "From  the  impossibility  of  the  consciousness 
of  a  free  act  arises  the  whole  distinction  between  ideality  and 
reality.''  x  With  Schelling,  as  with  Fichte,  activity  is  in  the 
truest  sense  ideal;  but  if  we  mean  by  real  that  which  seems 
independent  of  the  mind  of  the  subject,  and  to  be  governed 
by  necessary  laws  giving  no  evidence  of  its  ideal  character, 
then  the  unconscious  activity  of  spirit  as  it  manifests  itself 
in  the  objective  world  is  real. 

This  conception  of  unconscious  spirit,  which  attains  with 
Schelling  so  great  importance,  had  come  down  to  him  through 
Fichte  from  Kant.  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  teaches  that 
if  perceptions  are  to  form  one  continuous  consciousness,  and 
so  an  experience  at  all,  the  synthesizing  unity  of  apperception 
must  seize  upon  the  sense  given  elements  and  bind  them  to- 
gether. The  existence  of  relations  in  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness presupposes  that  they  have  been  construed  into  the 
manifold  by  thought.  This  synthetic  activity  of  thought,  then, 
is  deeper  than  the  ideas  which  it  synthesizes,  and  is  not  fully 
in  consciousness.  The  "I  think"  which  must  be  capable  of 
attending  every  idea  in  consciousness  is  evidence  of  the  syn- 
thetic unity,  but  not  the  apperception  itself.  Kant  recognizes 
in  the  activity  of  the  mind  several  stages  or  kinds  of  syn- 
thesis. The  data  of  sense  must  first  be  seized  upon  by  appre- 

1  Fichte,  Science  of  Knowledge,  Eng.  tr.,  p   219. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  43 

hension.  Then  elements  which  would  otherwise  have  gone 
must  be  reproduced,  redintegrated.  But  all  these  thought 
relations,  and  the  entire  work  of  synthesis  as  shown  in  appre- 
hension and  reproduction,  are  purely  subjective,  and  furnish 
no  basis  for  the  independence  and  orderliness  of  the  objective 
world.  It  is  the  work  of  the  productive  imagination  to  supply 
this  deficiency.  By  its  mode  of  functioning  the  productive 
imagination  gives  the  objective  basis  for  the  affinities  of 
presentations,  by  means  of  which  the  subjective  association 
first  becomes  impossible.  It  seems  to  be  the  stiffening  agent 
by  which  the  manifold  of  sense  is  hardened  into  a  cosmos 
obedient  to  definite  physical  laws — a  cosmos  concerning  which 
more  can  be  predicted  than  is  warranted  by  the  table  of  the 
categories.  It  ought  to  be  the  ground  of  explanation  for 
everything  in  experience  not  furnished  by  the  categories  of 
the  understanding  or  the  given  manifold,  and  even  for  the 
diversities  in  these.  This  important  sphere,  of  which  it  takes 
complete  possession  in  later  idealistic  thought,  is  only  hes- 
itatingly conceded  to  it  by  Kant.  The  precise  field  which  the 
productive  imagination  is  to  occupy  is  not  clearly  marked  off 
by  Kant,  but  its  importance  to  his  system  in  constructing  the 
objectivity  of  the  world  is  fully  recognized.  He  describes  it 
as  a  blind,  unconscious  faculty  of  the  soul,  a  form  of  synthe- 
sis in  which  the  elements  of  the  idea  are  bound  together  as 
they  have  perhaps  never  before  appeared  in  consciousness. 
It  is  the  same  activity,  he  says,  which  performs  one  activity 
as  productive  imagination,  and  another  as  synthetic  unity  of 
apperception.  And  since  the  syntheses  of  apprehension  and 
of  recognition  are  only  special  forms  of  the  apperceptive 
synthesis,  it  follows  that  all  these  faculties  which  Kant  has 
distinguished  are  but  modes  in  which  the  one  activity  of 
spirit  energizes. 

It  is  from  such  a  consideration  of  the  origin  of  the  principle 
of  the  unconscious  that  we  best  see  its  true  character.  It  was 
introduced  into  philosophy,  in  the  first  place,  not  to  explain 


44  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

the  causal  action  of  external  things  upon  our  sensibility,  but 
to  explain  the  possibility  of  a  rational  experience.  It  is  not 
therefore  a  substance,  or  any  residuum  or  abstraction  of 
objectivity.  It  is  rather  akin  to  will — a  relationship  that  be- 
came apparent  after  Fichte  had  united  the  practical  and  spec- 
ulative philosophy  of  Kant.  Activity  is  then  higher  and  more 
ultimate  than  existence  and  permanence.  "The  unconditioned 
cannot  be  sought  in  any  individual  thing,  nor  in  anything  of 
which  one  can  say  that  it  is.  *  *  *  Rather  there  is  revealed 
in  every  object  of  nature  a  principle  of  being  which  does  not 
itself  exist."  * 

The  further  fortunes  of  this  conception  of  an  unconscious 
spiritual  productivity  showed  that  it  had  not  reached  its 
final  form  with  Schelling.  In  itself  it  is  not  consonant  with 
the  spirit  of  idealism.  Idealism  must  define  the  real  as  the 
perfection  of  that  principle  displayed  in  the  idealism  of  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness,  then,  is  necessarily  inseparable 
from  spirit,  and  an  unconscious  spiritual  activity  is  wooden 
iron.  But  while  we  must  conceive  of  Real  Mind  in  terms  of 
consciousness,  it  is  evident  that  the  rational  motivation  of 
the  individual  finite  thinker  is  far  from  being  entirely  and 
clearly  displayed  within  the  finite  consciousness.  No  doubt 
that  fact  indicates  a  reflection  upon  the  finality,  the  self- 
sufficiency,  the  absolute  reality  of  the  finite  individual,  but 
this  inference  is  not  declined  by  idealism.  The  Principle  of 
the  System,  which  is  the  ground  both  of  knowing  and  of 
being,  is  active  in  the  individual's  thought.  The  logical  pro- 
pulsion which  results  from  this  over-individual  motivation  is 
apparent  even  in  perception,  although  perhaps  more  distinctly 
so  in  conception  and  inference.  No  scientific  or  philosophical 
mind,  not  even  the  most  talented,  can  exhaustively  state  and 
realize  the  implication  of  those  logical  promptings  of  which 
he  is  incipiently  conscious;  to  do  so  would  bring  to  each 
individual  the  full  consciousness  of  the  rational  cosmos.  Yet 

1  Schelling-,  Stimmtliche  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  11. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  45 

those  logical  promptings  are  not  simply  subjective  imaginings. 
They  are  intimations  of  universe  system,  and  have  their  centre 
of  gravity  in  the  Real,  the  Systematic  Universal.  From  the 
function  which  they  perform  in  building  the  structure  of 
science  and  of  truth  we  are  able  to  ascribe  to  them  over- 
individual  import.  This  import  is  implicated  in  our  con- 
sciousness, is  of  the  very  texture  of  reason  itself,  and  yet  is 
not  given  in  our  consciousness.  To  us,  then,  it  is  an  un- 
conscious control  of  our  thought  and  judgment ;  we  cannot  say 
That  it  indicates  an  agency  which  is  unconscious  in  itself,  or 
outside  the  purview  of  the  Absolute. 

The  point  of  departure  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  from 
transcendental  philosophy  having  been  indicated,  it  remains 
to  mention  two  other  metaphysical  principles  which  deter- 
mined Schelling's  treatment. 

In  the  first  place,  that  treatment  must  be  frankly  and  con- 
sciously monistic,  as  natural  science  is  not.  Wherever  sep- 
aratist principles  are  set  up  in  isolation  from  the  other 
forces  of  nature,  Schelling  sees  an  antagonist.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  vitalism  receives  his  condemnation,  even  while 
irs  Commonly  recognized  opponent,  mechanism,  does  not  win 
his  support.  It  is  this  that  makes  him  an  evolutionist,  re- 
garding every  new  form  of  being  as  only  a  new  gradation  of 
the  same  process  already  revealed  in  other  forms.  It  caused 
him  also  to  regard  all  forms  of  physical  force  as  varieties  of 
one  systematizing  force,  although  the  work  of  Joule  and 
Helmholz  had  not  yet  rendered  the  thought  an  easy  one  to 
hold.  Schelling's  Philosophy  of  Nature  must  be  monistic, 
then,  because  idealism  is  monistic;  but  it  must  enter  into  the 
details  of  nature  and  scientific  theory,  as  ordinary  philosophi- 
cal monism  has  not  felt  itself  compelled  to  do. 

In  the  second  place,  the  categories  which  exhibit  more 
perfectly  intrinsic  membership  of  parts  within  a  systematic 
whole  must  claim  for  Schelling  a  certain  superior  dignity 
and  truth,  as  against  those  which  do  not.  Accordingly, 


46  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

teleological  conceptions  will  dominate  over  mechanical  ones, 
and  conceptions  of  the  organic  world  over  those  of  the  in- 
organic one.  This  necessarily  follows  from  idealistic  presup- 
positions, since  the  ideal  is  real,  and  the  ideal,  as  determined 
through  the  idealism  of  consciousness,  culminates  in  a  uni- 
versal synthesizing  purpose,  an  organic  unity.  It  is  apparent 
in  Schelling  in  his  opposition  to  mechanical  conceptions  of 
matter,  in  his  conception  of  nature  as  a  universal  organism, 
and  in  many  minor  turns  of  his  thought. 

Subject  to  the  criticism  already  passed  upon  the  conception 
of  unconscious  mental  productivity,  it  would  seem  that  the 
foundations  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  as  here  described 
are  soundly  laid.  If  a  man  is  to  be  an  idealistic  thinker,  he 
must  address  his  thought  to  the  problems  of  natural  science 
under  the  guidance  of  the  three  principles  here  outlined;  and 
it  is  only  the  fact  that  other  writers  have  often  blinked  the 
problem  wThich  is  entailed  by  a  genuine  and  detailed  synthesis 
of  the  sciences  from  this  point  of  view  that  has  enabled  them 
to  neglect  the  building  of  an  idealistic  Naturphilosophiei 

C.  The  Problem  and  Method  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature. 

The  physical  sciences  deal  with  matter  and  force.  For 
them  matter  cannot  be  created  or  destroyed.  Even  the  par- 
ticles in  which  it  is  present  exist  eternally.  Moreover,  it  is 
in  a  certain  sense  inert.  The  possibility  of  a  science  of  me- 
chanics, and  with  it  of  physics  generally,  rests  upon  the 
principle  that  any  change  in  the  mode  of  behavior  of  a  ma- 
terial body  must  be  produced  by  an  external  cause.  The  mag- 
nitude of  the  effect  produced  will  bear  a  definitely  determin- 
able  relation  to  the  power  of  the  causes  operating  upon  a 
body  of  known  physical  qualities.  This  is  possible  only  if 
matter  is  capable  of  being  regarded  as  inert,  devoid  of  self- 
centered  spontaneity. 

But  transcendental  philosophy  has  declared  that  there  is 
nothing  in  the  world  but  spirit,  and  that  spirit  is  never  inert, 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  47 

but  is  freely  active.  This  conclusion  of  transcendental  phi- 
losophy must  be  accepted  by  the  Philosophy  of  Nature. 
"Nature  must  be  viewed  as  the  unconditioned.  The  idea  of 
the  existent  as  something  original  must  be  banished  from  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  as  from  transcendental  philosophy."  1 
"For  the  science  of  nature,  therefore,  nature  is  originally  only 
productivity  and  from  this  as  its  principle  science  must  set 
out."  2 

This  conception  of  nature  harmonizes  well  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  idealistic  philosophy.  But  the  facts  of  mechanics 
and  chemistry  do  not  obviously  square  with  it.  Perception 
seems  to  support  the  claim  of  scientific  theory  that  nature  is 
opposed  to  mind  and  totally  unlike  it.  Philosophy  asserts  that 
in  truth  no  such  nature  exists.  The  burden  of  proof,  then, 
is  upon  the  side  of  idealism.  It  must  point  out  in  detail  how 
a  principle  which  is  through  and  through  spirit  may  exert  its 
activities  in  such  a  manner  as  to  produce  the  appearance  of 
a  nature  subject  to  the  laws  of  mechanical  necessity  and 
quite  devoid  of  the  purposive  spontaneity  which  is  commonly 
ascribed  to  mind.  The  particular  findings  of  science  must  be 
interpreted  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  them  some  significance 
for  philosophy. 

It  is  Schelling's  great  merit  to  have  recognized  fully  the 
task  which  devolves  upon  idealism  in  the  interpretation  of 
Nature.  That  with  which  all  philosophical  speculation  deals 
is  nature  as  productivity,  natura  naturans.  This,  he  urges, 
is  nature  as  the  unconditioned  subject;  it  is  the  productive 
activity  in  its  unlimitedness.  In  antithesis  to  this,  however, 
arises  nature  as  product,  natura  naturata.  It  is  this  with 
which  all  empirical  knowledge  deals.  When  we  look  upon 
the  totality  of  objects  as  the  sum  of  being,  this  totality 
is  a  mere  product.  It  does  not  follow,  however,  that 
the  product  is  totally  distinct  from  the  productivity.  On 

1  Schelling-.  SammtUcJn?  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  12. 

2  Ibid,  S.  283. 


48  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

the  contrary,  the  productivity  is  working  in  and  through  the 
products.  The  ordinary  empirical  view,  fixing  its  attention 
upon  the  complex  of  products,  fails  to  recognize  the  produc- 
tivity. The  philosophical  view,  on  the  other  hand,  is  con- 
cerned primarily  with  the  productivity,  and  for  it  the  product 
vanishes  in  the  productivity.  "We  may  indeed  be  quite  cer- 
tain that  every  natural  phenomenon,  through  whatever  num- 
ber of  intermediate  links,  stands  in  connection  with  the  ulti- 
mate conditions  of  a  nature;  the  intermediate  links  them- 
selves, however,  may  be  unknown  to  us,  and  still  lying  hidden 
in  the  depths  of  nature."  1  But  still  the  facts  remain,  and 
are  not  to  be  lost  sight  of  by  a  speculative  theory  of  nature. 
Their  connection  with  that  higher  principle  must  then  be 
pointed  out.  The  task  which  confronts  idealistic  philosophy, 
then,  is  that  of  showing  in  what  manner  the  productivity  of 
nature,  which  is  not  matter,  passes  over  into  the  world  of 
products.  "The  chief  problem  of  Xatnrphilosophie  is  to  ex- 
plain, not  the  active  in  nature,  but  the  permanent."  2  But  now 
this  permanent  is  that  which  physical  science  recognizes  as 
matter,  from  the  qualities  of  which  it  seeks  to  explain  all 
physical  phenomena.  Accordingly,  the  explanation  of 
permanence  resolves  itself  into  an  account  of  the  manner  in 
which  matter  as  a  persistent  product  arises  through  the  ac- 
tivity of  a  spiritual  principle.  "The  sole  problem  of  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature  is  the  construction  of  matter."  3  It 
must  be  possible  to  exhibit  the  material  world  as  resulting 
from  absolute  spirit.  In  this  sense,  then,  Naturphilosophie 
is  a  construction  of  the  objective  world  upon  the  basis  of 
idealism.  Spirit  is  the  prius,  nature  results  from  it  and  has 
merely  a  derived  reality.  It  is  the  object  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Nature  to  present  matter  in  this  conditioned  relation  to 
spirit.  "By  this  deduction  of  all  natural  phenomena  from 

1  Schelling,  S'dmmtliche  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  279. 
2Jbid,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  18. 
3  Ibid,  Bd.  IV,  S.  3. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  49 

an  absolute  hypothesis,  our  knowing  is  changed  into  a  con- 
struction of  nature  itself,  that  is,  into  a  science  of  nature 
a  priori/' l 

But  although  the  task  of  a  theoretical  construction  of  ma- 
teriality, in  this  sense,  is  one  that  may  be  legitimately  pro- 
posed to  any  philosophy,  it  is  surprising  how  much  misunder- 
standing has  been  caused  by  Schelling's  statement  that 
NaturphilosopMe  must  construct  nature.  It  has  been  taken 
to  mean  that  the  philosopher,  resting  firmly  upon  the  onto- 
logical  principles  of  his  metaphysics,  must  strive  to  deduce 
from  them  the  particular  nature  of  matter  and  the  laws 
which  by  its  construction  matter  must  obey.  He  attempts  to 
do  this,  it  is  supposed,  without  any  reference  to  the  teachings 
which  experience  may  offer,  by  a  priori  deductions  from  con- 
ceptions. The  devotee  of  y  at  ur  philosophic  is  assumed  to  be- 
lieve that  he  finds  in  metaphysics  sufficient  grounds  for  reject- 
ing theories  which  science  accepts,  theories  which  are  purely 
scientific  and  have  no  metaphysical  character.  In  opposition 
to  these  scientifically  sound  and  metaphysically  innocuous 
theories  he  sets  up  theories  which  are  usually  metaphysically 
bad,  but  especially  are  for  science  rubbish.  For  these  latter 
views  he  advances  no  sufficient  scientific  support,  but  rests 
purely  upon  his  a  priori  deduction.  Concerning  the  value  of 
this  pleasant  dream  of  NatwrpMlosopMe  the  friends  of  em- 
pirical science  do  not  hold  two  opinions.  The  modern  phys- 
icist declares  that  not  one  characteristic  of  matter  or  prin- 
ciple of  physical  action  can  be  established  by  n  priori  reason- 
ing. From  Newton's  warning  against  metaphysics  to  Tait's 
fierce  tirades  against  a  priori  theorizing  upon  physical  sub- 
jects the  tide  of  scientific  opinion  has  run  strongly  against 
deductive  Xaturph  ilosoph  ie. 

Now  it  is  not  to*be  denied  that  much  of  the  censure  directed 
against  Naturphilosophie  by  men  of  science  has  been  deserved. 
It  was  due,  however,  largely  to  a  misconception  of  the  purpose 

1  Schelling,  SiimmtUclie  Werke,  Bel.  Ill,  S.  278. 
4 


50  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

and  intent  of  a,  speculative  Philosophy  of  Nature.  An  ideal- 
istic treatment  of  this  problem  which  retains  its  sanity  is  not 
obliged  to  contest  any  legitimate  deliverance  of  empirical 
science.  When  the  scientific  theory  is  expressed  in  terms 
which  carry  with  them  perverse  metaphysical  assumptions, 
it  sometimes  becomes  necessary  for  the  philosopher  to  insist 
that  the  theory  in  question  is  not  purely  scientific.  What  he 
is  actually  opposing,  however,  is  the  metaphysics  involved, 
and  not  the  empirical  knowledge  that  is  systematized  by  the 
theory.  He  is  laying  no  claim  to  the  right  to  use  philosophy 
as  an  instrument  of  scientific  discovery  or  of  proof  apart  from 
experience.  The  matter  has  been  well  put  by  Schelling :  "The 
assertion  that  natural  science  must  be  able  to  deduce  all  its 
principles  a  priori  is  in  a  measure  understood  to  mean  that 
natural  science  must  dispense  with  all  experience,  and,  with- 
out any  intervention  of  experience,  be  able  to  spin  all  its  prin- 
ciples out  of  itself — an  affirmation  so  absurd  that  the  very 
objections  to  it  deserve  pity.  Not  only  do  we  know  this  or 
that  through  experience,  but  we  originally  know  nothing  at 
all  except  through  experience.  *  *  *  But  every  datum 
which  is  merely  historical  for  me,  a  datum  of  experience,  be- 
comes, notwithstanding,  an  a  priori  principle  as  soon  as  I 
arrive,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  at  insight  into  its  in- 
ternal necessity.  *  *  *  It  is  not  therefore  that  we  KNOW 
nature,  ~but  nature  is  a  priori;  that  is,  every  individual  in  it 
is  predetermined  by  the  whole,  or  by  the  Idea  of  a  nature 
generally.  But  if  nature  is  a  priori,  then  it  must  be  possible 
to  recognize  it  as  something  that  is  a  priori,  and  this  is  really 
the  meaning  of  our  assertion."  1 

This  ought  to  be  a  sufficient  guarantee  that  Naturphiloso- 
phie,  so  long  as  it  remains  within  its  legitimate  sphere,  will 
not  attempt  to  establish  scientific  hypotheses  without  regard 
to  the  facts.  If  in  carrying  out  this  work  Schelling  did  not 
remain  within  the  legitimate  sphere  of  Naturphilosophie,  that 
does  not  prove  the  task  itself  a  mistaken  one. 

1  Schelling,  Sammtliche  WerJce,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  278-279. 


UNIVERSITY 

- 


;-X 

THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  51 

But  although  Schelling  grants  by  these  statements  that 
he  is  not  justified  in  deducing  from  metaphysical  principles 
the  particular  rules  of  the  material  world,  in  two  important 
respects  he  offends  against  the  spirit  of  this  admission.  In 
the  first  place,  he  offers  fanciful  scientific  hypotheses,  and  ex- 
hibits them  as  necessarily  resulting  from  his  more  funda- 
mental principles.  In  fact  the  logical  connection  is  always 
faulty,  and  therefore  the  weakness  of  the  theories  apparently 
deduced  does  not  for  the  philosopher  impeach  the  principles 
from  which  they  are  said  to  be  derived,  although  it  has  ren- 
dered the  whole  work  unpopular  with  men  of  scientific  tem- 
perament. The  second  point  is  of  greater  philosophical  im- 
portance. Schelling  insists  in  sober  earnest  that  the  entire 
body  of  doctrine  which  he  calls  dynamics  may  be  constructed 
a  priori  without  recourse  to  experience.1  By  dynamics  he 
here  means  the  theory  of  matter,  not  in  so  far  as  matter  is 
regarded  as  in  motion  and  interaction,  but  in  so  far  as  it 
is  regarded  as  composed  of  moving  forces.  It  will  be  found 
that  Schelling's  success  in  establishing  those  features  of  his 
dynamics  which  he  regards  as  sustained  chiefly  by  a  priori 
considerations  has  not  been  such  as  to  vindicate  the  validity 
of  the  method.  If  he  had  held  firmly  by  his  principle  that 
we  do  not  spell  out  nature  by  a  priori  method,  but  only  aim 
to  recognize  it  as  something  that  really  is  a  priori,  lie  would 
perhaps  have  escaped  censure  upon  this  point.  By  disregard- 
ing it.  however,  he  has  given  an  opportunity  for  Lotze  and 
others  to  urge  with  justice  that  we  cannot  hope  to  construct 
reality,  but  must  be  contented  if  we  can  be  so  fortunate  as  to 
recognize  it  in  its  true  character.  It  is.  true  that  we  cannot 
construct  nature,  but  if  nature  is  a  construction  of  spirit,  is 
a  priori  and  we  recognize  it  in  its  true  character,  our  philos- 
ophy of  nature  becomes  a  recognition  of  nature  as  an  a  priori 
construction.  The  principles  which  form  the  content  of  our 
Philosophy  of  Nature  may  be  elaborated  ~by  us  with  the  most 

Rebelling,  8'dm-mtliclie  Werke,  Bd.  II,  S.  276. 


52  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

painstaking  scientific  induction.  Independently  of  our  subjec- 
tive mode  of  attaining  to  the  knowledge  of  these  principles, 
however,  the  principles  themselves  must  be  regarded  as  in  a 
logical  connection  and  subordination,  the  conscious  articula- 
tion of  which  for  our  minds  is  the  setting  forth  of  an  a  priori 
schematization  of  thought.  The  method  of  science  may  be  a 
posteriori,  but  its  ideal  goal  is  an  a  priori  one. 

I).  Relation  of  the  Idea  of  Hatter  to  the  Theory  of  Perception. 

A  transcendental  exposition  of  the  idea  of  matter  must 
show  how  the  idea  is  connected  with  the  functioning  of  the 
intellect,  and  point  out  its  origin  in  human  knowledge.  It  is 
this  task  that  Kant  failed  to  perform.  His  method  was  that 
of  analyzing  the  idea  of  matter,  conceived  as  that  which  fills 
space  in  a  definite  degree.  But  this  analytical  mode  of  pro- 
cedure is  thoroughly  objective,  and  does  not  establish  the 
connection  between  the  idea  of  matter  and  the  intellect  which 
engenders  that  idea.  To  this  method  Schelling  opposes  the 
synthetic  construction  of  matter.  The  conception  is  to  arise 
gradually  before  our  eyes,  and  we  are  to  find  in  its  origin  the 
ground  of  its  necessity. 

But  now,  if  we  grant,  with  Kant,  that  matter  is  constituted 
of  two  forces,  whence  do  we  get  the  conception  of  those  forces  ? 
It  is  of  course  possible  to  answer,  says  Schelling,  that  we  get 
it  by  inference.  We  do  indeed  get  the  conception  by  infer- 
ence, but  a  mere  conception  has  no  meaning.  If  the  concep- 
tion is  to  possess  any  real  significance,  that  must  be  gained 
from  perception.  It  is  only  by  the  fact  that  conceptions  are 
founded  upon  perceptions  that  they  relate  to  reality.  Granted 
that  we  are  able  to  imagine  attractive  and  repulsive  forces — 
that  fact  only  makes  them  a  mere  thought  product.  What 
we  wished  to  assert,  however,  was  that  matter,  as  composed 
of  real  forces,  actually  exists.  Now  reality  is  given  us,  not 
mediately  by  means  of  concepts,  but  immediately  in  percep- 
tion. If  then  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  are  to  be  as- 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  53 

oribed  to  matter,  the  grounds  of  such  attribution  must  be 
found  in  perception.  If  it  can  be  shown  from  the  character- 
istics of  our  perception  that  the  object  of  perception  must 
be  regarded  as  the  product  of  attractive  and  repulsive  forces, 
tln-st*  forces  become  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  perception 
itself,  and  from  this  fact  they  derive  the  necessity  with  which 
they  are  thought. 

Thus  Schelling  argues,  and  at  this  point  he  makes  a  false 
step..  He  has  shown  that  since  it  is  only  in  perception  that 
our  ideas  gain  reality,  perception  must  furnish  the  basis  for 
any  theory  of  the  composition  of  matter.  This  harmless  prop- 
osition is  one  with  which  empirical  science  can  heartily 
agree.  For  the  scientist  it  means  that  no  theory  not  based 
upon  the  deliverances  of  perception  can  claim  validity. 
Schelling  understands  it  to  mean,  however,  that  we  are  to  find 
a  basis  for  the  theory  of  matter  in  the  theory  of  perception, 
rather  than  in  the  facts  which  it  offers.  The  argument  is  not 
that  we  perceive  matter  as  acting  so-and-so,  and  are  accord- 
ingly forced  to  infer  that  in  order  to  render  such  action  pos- 
sible its  composition  must  be  of  a  certain  definite  character. 
The  argument  rather  is  that  since  matter  is  the  object  of  per- 
ception, the  elements  which  go  to  construct  perception  must 
also  go  to  construct  the  object  of  perception.  Matter,  then, 
will  be  constituted  for  physical  theory  in  the  same  way  as  is 
perception  for  the  science  of  knowledge.  This  reasoning  is 
clearly  erroneous.  The  discussion  of  the  general  implications 
of  the  subject-object  relationship  does  not  settle  the  theory 
of  the  more  intimate  constitution  of  matter. 

The  error  of  supposing  that  the  theory  of  perception  affords 
the  key  for  an  a  priori  theory  of  matter  is  the  source  of  many 
of  the  difficulties  encountered  by  the  Naturphttosophie  in  the 
field  of  metaphysics.  The  position  could  be  maintained  only 
by  the  assertion  of  the  identity  of  matter  and  cognition,  and 
therefore  rendered  necessary  the  support  given  by  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Identity.  The  error  is  of  less  importance  for  the 


54  THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM. 

Philosophy  of  Nature  itself,  however,  from  the  fact  that 
Schelling  deceives  himself  in  believing  that  his  theory  of  the 
construction  of  matter  is  derived  strictly  from  the  theory  of 
perception.  In  fact  it  is  derived  much  as  was  that  of  Kant, 
by  analyzing  the  idea  of  matter;  and  it  is  therefore  able  to 
maintain  itself  on  its  merits,  until  a  deeper  connection  can  be 
shown  up  with  the  principles  of  idealism. 

But  now  if,  as  Schelling  holds,  the  reason  for  the  necessary 
ascription  of  opposed  forces  to  matter  lies  in  the  nature  of 
perception,  we  are  driven  to  ask,  What  is  the  nature  of  per- 
ception? Pure  theoretical  philosophy  gives  an  adequate  an- 
swer upon  this  point.  For  perception,  there  is  presupposed 
on  one  side  an  activity  of  the  intellect,  an  activity  which  is 
not  checked  or  limited  by  anything  in  its  own  nature.  But 
on  the  other  hand  there  must  be  opposed  to  this  naturally 
infinite  ideal  activity  another  activity  of  mind,  by  virtue  of 
which  the  first  is  checked.  Only  thus  can  a  definite  product 
arise.  If  the  ideal  activity  were  allowed  to  continue  un- 
checked to  infinity,  it  would  remain  a  mental  act,  to  be  sure; 
but  no  mental  fact,  no  determinate  idea,  and  therefore  no  con- 
sciousness could  ever  arise.  The  real  activity  which  opposes 
the  ideal  one  is  negative  in  the  sense  that  all  we  can  predicate 
of  it  is  its  limitation  of  the  positive  ideal  activity.  The  prod- 
uct in  which  the  two  are  united  is  the  finite  perception. 

From  this  view  of  the  rise  of  perception  it  becomes  clear 
that  the  world  of  phenomena  results  from  an  original  strife  of 
opposed  spiritual  activities.  All  reality  (WirkUchkeit]  is 
nothing  else  than  that  strife,  in  its  infinite  productions  and 
reproductions.  A  world  exists,  then,  only  for  spirit,  and 
since  the  actual  world  is  not  entirely  known  by  any  finite 
spirit,  it  exists  for  an  infinite  spirit.  On  the  one  hand  there 
is  no  objective  existence  (Dasein)  without  a  spirit  to  know 
it,  and  on  the  other  hand  there  is  no  spirit  for  which  a  world 
does  not  exist. 

At  a  higher  grade  of  cognition  the  mind  comes   to  view 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  .")•"> 

itself  as  that  which  knows,  and  to  recognize  its  own  freedom. 
In  order  to  feel  itself  free  and  the  subject  of  knowledge,  how- 
ever, it  must  ascribe  independence  and  objectivity  to  the  prod- 
uct. It  is  in  this  way  that  the  subjective  and  objective  worlds 
become  separated  for  consciousness.  The  objective  world  then 
stands  before  the  mind  as  something  independent  of  it.  But 
in  the  object  those  opposed  activities  by  which  it  was  pro- 
duced in  perception  have  now  become  permanent.  They  there 
appear  as  the  forces  of  matter.  These  activities  are  of  a 
spiritual  nature,  it  is  true;  but  their  mental  origin  lies  out- 
side of  consciousness,  since  by  them  consciousness  first  comes 
into  existence.  They  seem,  then,  to  be  not  of  mental  nature, 
and  even' to  be  opposed  to  mind.  In  this  light  they  appear  to 
belong  to  the  object  by  itself,  regardless  of  a  possible  intel- 
ligence. 

Now  we  may  concede,  I  suppose,  that  for  idealistic  philos- 
ophy force  must  be  reduced  to  factors  operative  in  conscious- 
ness. It  cannot  be,  as  with  Spencer,  a  great  Unknown  lying 
beyond  the  phenomena,  where  conscious  experience  can  never 
reach  it.  but  must  be  implicated  in  the  very  fibre  of  expe- 
rience. But  the  particular  manner  in  which  Schelling  wishes 
to  pass  from  the  theory  of  perception  to  the  theory  of  matter 
should  be  closely  scrutinized.  Let  us  concede  that  for  per- 
ception the  world  is  formed  by  the  opposition  of  two  activities ; 
does  it  follow  that  after  consciousness  comes  to  distinguish 
a  subjective  and  an  objective  world,  and  after  we  direct  our 
attention  solely  to  the  theoretical  construction  of  the  objective 
world,  we  shall  be  able  to  find  in  that  the  same  opposition  of 
limiting  and  unlimited  activities?  By  no  means. 

According  to  the  account  given  by  Schelling  in  the  7V///X- 
<-t  mlrntiil  Idrnlixni.  it  is  the  ideal  activity,  the  activity  which 
extends  beyond  the  check  given  by  its  opposite,  which  becomes 
transformed  for  consciousness  into  the  world  of  things.  The 
real  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  the  opposition  be- 
tween the  soul  and  the  world  of  things  becomes  explicit,  is 


56  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

fixed  for  consciousness  as  the  independent  soul,  the  Ego-in- 
itself.     So  long,  then,  as  no  distinction  between  subject  and 
object  has  occurred  for  consciousness,  he  who  separates  out 
from  the  rest  any  bit  of  cognitive  experience  will  find  implied 
in  it  both  of  the  activities  in  question.     But  as  vet  it  is  im- 
possible to  speak   of  a  nature  at  all.     In   knowledge  as   it 
actually  exists,  however,  the  abstraction  of  the  object  from 
the  subject  has  been  carried  out.    Only  after  this  abstraction 
has  been  made  can  we  with  any  propriety  discuss  the  theo- 
retical constitution  of  the  world  of  objects.    But  in  analyzing 
the  process  by  which  this  distinction  arises  Schelling  finds 
that  only  one  activity  is  concerned   in   the  construction   of 
things  conceived  as  independent  of  consciousness.    That  is  the 
ideal  activity,  which,  not  stopping  at  the  mere  fact  of  percep- 
tion, goes  on  beyond  the  check  and  attempts  to  explain  to  the 
Ego  the  rational,  grounds  for  the  perception.     The  thing-in- 
itself  is  therefore  the  shadow  of  the  ideal  activity  of  the  self. 
So  long  as  it  remains  purely  objective,  it  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  opposed  activity;  although  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
overcoming  this  abstraction,  looks  at  it  in  its  relation  to  the 
subject.     For  the  purposes  of  the  science  and  philosophy  of 
Mature,   however,  it  is  entirely   legitimate  to   make  this  ab- 
straction.    But  if  we  take  nature  thus  as  independent,  we 
have  rid  it  of  its  subjection  to  the  condition  of  perception, 
and  are  considering   it   purely   theoretically.     Theoretically, 
however,  the  objective  world  is  wholly  the  construction  of  the 
ideal    or    explanation-demanding    function    of    intelligence — 
the  other  activity  is  not  operative  in  this  field.     To  be  sure 
the  ideal  activity,  as  one  of  the  elements  necessary  to  knowl- 
edge,  implies  the  continual  opposition   of  its  antithetic   ac- 
tivity.   It  is  knowledge,  however,  and  not  the  theoretical  con- 
struction of  the  object  itself,  that  implies  this  opposition.    The 
theory  of  matter,  then,  must  be  carried  out  in  entire  depend- 
ence upon  the  rationalizing  or  ideal  activity  of  mind. 

This  conclusion  is  of  much  importance  to  our  criticism  of 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  57 

Schelling.  The  latter  had  espoused  the  cause  of  dynamism 
in  physics,  but  regarded  himself  as  bound  by  his  metaphysics 
to  a  certain  form  of  dynamism.  Matter  must  be  composed  of 
an  infinite  expansive  force  and  a  limiting  attractive  force,  a 
synthesis  of  the  two  being  effected  by  the  force  of  gravitation. 
This  entire  doctrine,  which  he  called  dynamics,  Schelling  re- 
garded as  demonstrable  a  priori  from  the  theory  of  knowledge. 
But  we  find  that  in  his  attempt  so  to  connect  the  theory  of 
matter  with  the  theory  of  perception  that  the  former  may 
appear  as  deduced  a  priori  he  is  guilty  of  a  mistake  in  the 
inference.  The  deduction  is  faulty. 

The  philosopher,  then,  who  should  accept  the  more  general 
principles  of  idealism  from  which  Schelling  starts  out,  and 
even  indorse  his  general  conception  of  the  problem  and  method 
of  Naturphilosophie,  is  not  bound  to  give  adherence  to  the 
particular  theory  of  the  construction  of  matter  which  Schel- 
ling believed  he  had  deduced  from  those  principles.  And  this 
result  may  afford  relief;  for  dynamism  in  the  form  presented 
by  Kant  and  Schelling  was  not  without  its  scientific  diffi- 
culties. To  chemists,  in  particular,  it  was  obnoxious;  for 
while  chemistry  opposes  nothing  to  dynamical  conceptions,  as 
is  clear  from  modern  Energetics,  yet  it  found  in  Schelling's 
theory  no  genuine  foundation  provided.  In  fact  it  remains 
a  problem  for  close  empirical  study,  the  problem  of  the  more 
intricate  constitution  of  matter.  That  study  may  be  led  by 
philosophical  motives,  and  its  theoretical  validity  may  in  fact 
stand  or  fall  with  the  validity  of  idealistic  categories  in  phi- 
losophy, to  such  a  degree  that  empirical  study  cannot  be 
opposed  absolutely  to  philosophical  synthesis;  but  a  specula- 
tive construction  of  materiality  which  aims  to  dispense  with 
it  altogether  is  in  any  case  baseless. 

A  second  general  line  of  criticism  is  opened  up  by  the  re- 
flection that  the  transcendentalist  has  imported  these  opposed 
activities  into  the  theory  of  perception  simply  by  reason  of 
physical  analogies.  The  categories  which  must  be  developed 


58  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

in  order  to  treat  the  theory  of  knowledge  are  the  highest  and 
most  involved  that  we  gain  in  any  type  of  science.  In  Hegel's 
formulation,  the  categories  of  the  Notion  are  alone  adequate 
to  this  problem;  all  others,  and  particularly  those  of  dy- 
namical science,  make  their  shortcomings  apparent  in  this 
field.  And  it  is  obvious  that  essentially  this  position  must  be 
held  by  philosophy,  if  the  root  conceptions  of  idealism  are 
to  be  maintained  as  against  a  naturalistic  mode  of  thought. 
If  the  knowing  relation  could  be  exhaustively  denned  in  terms 
of  physical  categories,  there  would  be  an  end  of  idealism.  No 
doubt  all  scientific  categories,  and  therefore  those  in  which 
the  theory  of  perception  and  conception  is  expressed,  are  at- 
tempts to  formulate  insights  into  Universe  Order;  and  no 
doubt  physics  finds  it  easiest  to  discuss  universe  order  in 
terms  of  its  categories.  These  categories,  however,  do  not 
exhaust  the  implications  of  any  single  act  of  knowledge,  and 
are  in  fact  only  abstractions  from  certain  of  the  relatively 
simple  forms  in  which  the  conception  of  Universe  Order  is 
revealed  within  our  consciousness.  The  physical  analysis  of 
motions  was  already  foreshadowed  in  the  idea  of  opposing 
forces  brought  forward  by  Heraclitus,  and  the  Protagorean 
theory  of  knowledge  availed  itself  of  this  idea.  It  is  easy  to 
grasp,  and  is  therefore  popular.  Empirical  psychology  uses 
it,  although  even  psychology  passes  beyond  it.  Fichte's 
Science  of  Knowledge  picks  up  the  ideas  without  criticism,  be- 
cause its  ultimate  purpose  is  to  pass  beyond  them.  The  face 
that  they  figure  in  certain  portions  of  the  Wiasenachaftslehre, 
then,  by  no  means  confers  upon  these  opposing  activities  a 
fundamental  philosophical  importance. 

In  short,  the  two  opposing  activities  occur  in  the  theory  of 
perception  chiefly  by  reason  of  physical  analogies.  They  creep 
in  without  criticism.  The  thinker  who  should  then  turn 
about  and  "deduce"  physical  theories  from  them  would  be 
reasoning  in  a  circle.  Universe  Order  in  some  form  is  essen- 
tially involved  in  perception,  and  in  some  lower  and  more  ab- 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  59 

struct  form  it  will  constitute  the  theme  of  physical  theory;  but 
what  form  it  shall  take  for  physics  must  be  determined  by  the 
analysis  of  physical  experience,  and  not  by  the  theory  of  per- 
ception. If  we  first  wrap  up  in  our  theory  of  perception  some 
special  physical  preconceptions,  it  is  no  great  intellectual 
achievement  to  find  them  there  again. 

E.  Matter  </*•  (/  Force-Product. 

We  have  criticised  Schelling's  deduction  of  the  theory  of 
matter.  It  remains  to  examine  that  theory  on  its  merits. 

The  theory  runs  very  closely  in  accordance  with  that  of 
Kant,  although  it  varies  somewhat  in  different  presentations. 
In  general,  however,  Schelling  conceives  his  task  to  be  that  of 
connecting  the  dynamical  interpretation  more  closely  with 
transcendental  philosophy.  At  the  close  of  the  discussion 
of  the  line  of  thought  already  examined,  he  says:  "We  have 
now  reached  the  point  in  our  investigations  where  the  idea 
of  matter  becomes  capable  of  analytical  handling,  and  the 
principles  of  dynamics  can  be  derived  from  this  idea  alone. 
This  work,  however,  has  been  done  in  Kant's  Metaphysical 
Basis  of  the  Natural  Sciences  with  such  evidence  and  com- 
pleteness that  nothing  further  is  left  over  to  supply  here."  x 
Some  additional  comments  are  suggested,  and  in  other  pre- 
sentations a  more  considerable  difference  appears,  but  no  es- 
sential injustice  will  -be  done  to  Schelling  by  discussing  his 
theory  in  this  form. 

Xow  there  are  two  great  difficulties  with  a  physical  dy- 
namism of  the  form  here  presented.  In  the  first  place,  the  two 
forces  which  it  postulates  are  only  elements  of  conceptual 
analysis,  and  we  can  gain  no  warrant  for  holding  that  they 
correspond  to  any  real  cleavage  in  the  nature  of  things; 
that  is  of  things  as  they  are  for  absolute  thought.  In  the 
second  place,  the  entire  dynamical  view  of  nature  presupposes 
certain  non-dynamical  or  Platonic  elements;  so  that  however 

Rebelling,  8'dmmtUche  Werke,  Bd.  II,  S.  231. 


60  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

successful  its  polemic  may  be  against  the  metaphysical  hypo- 
statization  of  corpuscular  mechanics,  its  own  thought  also  is 
inadequate. 

The  first  objection  does  not  assert  that  these  forces  are  en- 
tirely arbitrary.  On  the  contrary,  just  because  all  analysis 
really  implies  a  previous  synthesis,  and  because  the  elements 
which  are  analyzed  into  these  forces  were  synthesized  from 
experience,  they  do  have  reference  to  objective  reality.  But 
they  are  artificial  expressions  for  the  understanding  of  that 
which  in  reality  is  bound  up  together. 

Schelling  partially  recognizes  that  this  is  the  case,  but 
strives  to  avoid  admitting  it.  "The  fundamental  forces  of 
matter,"  he  says,  "are  therefore  nothing  more  than  the  ex- 
pression for  the  understanding  of  those  original  activities, 
the  reflection,  not  the  reality  itself,  which  is  in  perception."  * 
"In  reflection  we  may  separate  the  two;  to  think  them  as 
separated  in  reality  is  absurd."  2  Indeed,  it  is  because  they 
are  concepts  and  not  the  realities,  that  we  are  able  to  make 
them  definite  as  explanations  of  the  nature  of  matter,  and 
found  upon  them  the  science  of  dynamics.  Passages  of  this 
sort  may  be  multiplied,  but  are  not  entirely  free  from  am- 
biguity. Against  these  may  be  placed  a  number  of  citations 
having  an  opposite  tenor.  Speaking  of  attractive  force,  he 
says,  "But  one  must  not  think  that  one  can  derive  it  from  some 
merely  logical  predicate  of  matter — I  know  not  what — ac- 
cording to  the  law  of  contradiction  alone.  For  the  idea  of 
matter  is  itself,  in  its  origin,  synthetic.  A  merely  logical  con- 
cept of  matter  is  absurd,  and  the  real  concept  of  matter  itself 
first  arises  through  the  synthesis  of  these  forces  by  the 
imagination."  3 

The  real  basis  for  the  apparent  opposition  between  these 
passages  is  found  in  Schelling's  claim  that  Kant's  theory  had 
been  left  as  purely  analytical  and  logical;  that  his  own,  how- 

1  Schelling,  S'dmmtliche  Werke,  Bd.  II,  S.  228. 

2  Ibid,  S.  234. 

3  Ibid,  S.  235. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  61 

ever,  by  pointing  out  the  original  synthesis  of  opposed  activities 
in  perception,  had  changed  the  entire  standing  of  the  concep- 
tion and  given  it  real  import.  If  we  take  the  notion  of  matter 
as  it  stands  in  ordinary  consciousness  as  the  basis  for 
analysis,  as  did  Kant,  Schelling  agrees,  both  in  the  passages 
quoted  and  in  others  that  might  be  cited,  that  the  distinction 
is  in  danger  of  representing  merely  a  self-made  opposition  of 
ideas,  and  not  a  real  opposition  of  objective  forces.  But  since 
his  own  transcendental  deduction,  which  was  to  save  the  day 
for  the  attractive  and  repulsive  forces,  has  been  found  inade- 
quate to  do  so,  dynamism  has  not  succeeded  in  safeguarding 
the  objective  significance  of  its  two  historic  basal  forces. 

This  result  does  not  impugn  the  principles  of  dynamism, 
but  simply  the  form  which  it  took  with  these  winters,  and 
readily  tends  to  take.  It  reinforces  the  conclusion  already 
drawn,  that  for  a  consistent  idealism  the  theory  of  matter  is 
to  be  drawn,  not  from  a  priori  reasonings,  but  from  a  study 
of  the  implications  of  physical  experience.  Idealism  holds,  to 
be  sure,  that  knowledge  is  idealization,  and  that  no  scientific 
.theory  could  take  from  except  through  the  leadership  of  a 
conception  of  Absolute  Order — an  element  of  knowledge  not 
copied  from  sense.  In  dealing  with  the  concept  of  matter, 
then,  speculative  thought  may  direct  its  attention  not  so  much 
to  the  properties  manifested  as  to  the  ground  in  which  they  are 
founded.  Analysis  consists  in  so  working  out  the  thought  of 
this  ground  of  connection  that  it  can  serve  as  an  explanation 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  qualities  exhibited  in  sense  do 
actually  cohere  and  reciprocally  condition  one  another.  It  is 
obvious  that  such  an  analysis  can  be  carried  out  only  on  the 
basis  of  the  properties  actually  to  be  explained.  It  is  the 
Auseinandersctzcn-  of  the  implications  involved  in  the  notion 
of  a  general  ground  for  the  properties  of  matter,  and  if  these 
implications  are  to  be  fully  set  forth  account  must  be  taken 
of  all  the  modes  of  behavior  of  matter  which  are  to  find  ex- 
planation therein. 


62  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

An  analytical  process  which  is  carried  on  thus  with  constant 
reference  to  the  synthesis  of  elements  by  the  aid  of  which  the 
idea  of  matter  is  built  up  cannot  be  charged  with  dealing  in 
purely  self-made  conceptions.  It  is  true  that  the  elements 
into  which  it  resolves  matter  are  concepts.  But  unless  we 
are  to  be  plunged  into  a  thoroughgoing  phenomenalism — an 
impossible  philosophy — properly  formed  concepts  must  have 
an  objective  significance.  The  possibility  of  science  in  any 
form  rests  upon  our  right  to  formulate  concepts  which  are 
applicable  to  facts.  We  can  never  reach  a  principle  of  ex- 
planation, and  so  a  true  science,  except  as  we  go  beyond  the 
facts  presented.  This  is  the  transcendental  factor  in  science. 
Tn  so  doing  we  rely  upon  the  conviction  that  things  are  in 
reality  constructed  upon  universal  principles,  our  problem 
being  only  to  find  out  what  in  particular  those  principles  are. 
Here  the  transcendental  element  is  specifying  itself  as  the 
dominant  universal,  a  rational  idea  which  judgment  is  postu- 
lating as  real.  In  adopting  any  principle  of  explanation  we 
can  be  certain  that  it  is  the  correct  one  only  by  repeatedly 
testing  it  to  be  sure  that  the  facts  readily  arrange  themselves 
in  accordance  with  it.  The  distinctions  which  we  make  are 
primarily  ours,  and  it  is  only  after  working  out  our  theory  to 
its  results  and  testing  it  fully  and  repeatedly  by  the  facts  that 
we  may  be  permitted  to  maintain  that  the  distinctions  obtain 
in  reality  precisely  as  we  have  drawn  them. 

It  follows  that  the  forces  which  we  are  to  attribute  to  matter 
even  as  the  result  of  an  analysis  of  what  is  involved  in  matter 
must  issue  only  from  a  careful  study  of  physical  phenomena. 
Whenever  facts  are  discovered  which  render  it  evident  that  a 
division  like  that  made  by  Kant  does  not  represent  reality,  a 
new  foundation  of  the  concept  is  in  order.  Hartmann  is  there- 
fore justified,  so  far  as  philosophy  is  concerned,  when  he  sup- 
poses that  atoms  of  one  kind  possess  only  attractive  force, 
those  of  another  kind  only  repulsive  force.  He  has  dispensed 
with  the  idea  of  a  purely  negative  force,  an  attraction,  neces- 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  63 

sary  to  limit  the  expansion  of  the  repulsive  force,  and  supposes 
that  expansion  exerts  from  a  given  centre  only  a  definite  quan- 
tity of  force.  The  absurd  view  of  Kant  and  Schelling  that  an 
attractive  force  is  necessary  to  keep  repulsion  from  expanding 
the  body  to  infinity  is  rejected.  For  Hartmann  the  attraction 
exerted  by  body  atoms  increases  inversely  as  the  square  of 
the  distance,  while  the  repellent  ether  atoms  exert  a  force  of 
resistance  which  increases  inversely  as  a  higher  power  of  the 
distance,  probably  from  the  third  to  the  fifth.  By  Boscovich 
and  others  it  was  supposed  that  the  atoms  exert  an  attraction 
for  one  another  at  molar  distances,  but  at  molecular  distances 
a  repulsion  which  increases  very  rapidly  with  the  decrease  of 
the  intervening  distance.  It  is  clear  that  none  of  these  specu- 
lations are  ruled  out  by  metaphysical  considerations.  The 
only  criterion  of  their  value,  then,  is  the  success  which  they 
meet  in  introducing  order  into  facts. 

The  second  objection  to  dynamism  urged  that  other  factors 
besides  force  were  necessary  to  the  theory  of  matter.  This 
objection  has  different  values  according  to  the  two  different 
levels  at  which  it  is  raised. 

\Ylien  raised  by  the  popular  mind,  or  even  by  most  partisans 
of  the  mechanical  theory  of  matter,  it  expresses  a  truth  in 
form  so  feeble  and  obscure  as  to  be  almost  useless.  One  comes 
to  speak  of  matter  and  its  forces,  and  then  supposes  that  in- 
dependently of  his  thought  and  language  matter  and  force 
bear  such  a  relation  to  one  another  as  these  words  imply.  A 
separation  of  matter  from  force  takes  place,  which  leaves  it 
incomprehensible  how  they  can  act  together.  This  is  a  com- 
mon result  of  the  metaphysics  of  ordinary  thought.  The  mind 
looks  for  something  wThieh  shall  be  permanent  and  the  common 
ground  of  our  changing  sensations.  The  mechanical  concep- 
tion of  matter,  as  inert  extended  substance,  explains  perma- 
nence, and  furnishes  a  general  ground  for  sensation.  The 
element  of  change  is  not  sufficiently  illuminated  by  this  con- 
ception, however,  and  the  idea  of  force  as  a  cause  of  motion 


64  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

is  added.  With  these  two  factors  popular  thought  can  get  on ; 
but  it  sees  in  the  conception  of  force  alone  no  explanation  of 
the  permanence  and  law  which  rule  in  nature.  Activity  may 
well  be  caprice. 

To  physicists,  however,  it  soon  becomes  apparent  that  an 
ultimate  duality  of  force  and  matter  is  not  defensible.  The 
effort  ensues  to  eliminate  one  of  the  conceptions,  and  corpus- 
cular mechanics,  as  Schelling  called  it,  eliminates  force.  It 
assumes  matter  as  being  in  motion.  Maxwell  says,  "Force  is 
but  one  aspect  of  that  mutual  action  between  bodies  which  is 
called  by  Newton  Action  and  Reaction."  x  Force  becomes  a 
mere  formula,  valuable  for  the  expression  of  mathematical  re- 
lations, but  not  the  concept  of  some  real  thing  causing  the 
relation.  A  thoroughgoing  phenomenalism  is  thus  applied  to 
the  idea  of  force,  even  when  it  is  not  so  applied  to  matter  and 
motion. 

Now  phenomenalism  is  an  excellent  methodological  device  in 
a  special  science,  especially  if  it  is  fairly  and  evenly  applied; 
but  it  is  of  no  avail  as  a  thoroughgoing  theory  of  matter.  For 
every  judgment  by  its  very  nature  claims  to  be  a  declaration 
regarding  truth;  and  this  primal  claim,  of  reason  is  indefeas- 
ible. A  consistent  and  thoroughgoing  phenomenalism  is  impos- 
sible. In  fact,  then,  no  category  of  science  is  wholly  phe- 
nomenal in  its  import;  in  each  the  real  order  of  the  world  is 
more  or  less  successfully  seized.  And  accordingly  few  minds 
can  really  hold  the  thought  of  the  phenomenality  of  all  sci- 
entific ideas.  The  attempt  to  treat  force  as  phenomenal  usu- 
ally issues  in  ascribing  reality  to  matter,  motion,  and  space. 

But  this  course  cannot  be  followed  out,  for  it  leads  into  new 
and  insuperable  difficulties.  Modern  physics  is  founded  upon 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  It  is  only  by  means 
of  the  distinction  between  potential  and  kinetic  energy,  how- 
ever, that  this  principle  can  be  made  to  work.  The  active  or 
kinetic  energy  involved  in  any  physical  change  is  not  neces- 

1  Maxwell,  Matter  and  Motion,  CI. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  65 

sari ly  conserved  as  kinetic,  but  may  become  potential,  and 
nYc  versa.  But  if  energy  is  to  be  denned  as  a  relation  of 
masses  and  velocities,  the  assertion  that  the  energy  involved 
is  conserved  would  necessarily  mean  that  in  a  set  of  physical 
changes  the  solution  of  the  force-formula,  a  relation  of  masses 
and  velocities,  will  always  be  the  same.  But  since  the  mass 
must  remain  constant,  on  atomistic  principles  the  velocities 
must  also  remain  constant.  In  other  words,  all  energy  must  be 
active  at  every  moment.  This  involves  the  denial  of  potential 
energy,  and  the  reduction  of  all  force  in  the  world  to  kinetic 
energy.  That  the  principles  of  corpuscular  mechanics,  strictly 
carried  out,  lead  to  this  result,  has  been  recognized.  Stallo 
says.  "The  proposition  here  insisted  upon  is  irrecusable  by 
any  consistent  advocate  of  the  mechanical  theory."  *  Tait, 
speaking  of  the  classical  theory  of  corpuscular  physics  founded 
by  Le  Sage,  says,  aThe  most  singular  thing  about  it  is  that  if 
it  be  true,  it  will  probably  lead  us  to  regard  all  kinds  of 
energy  as  ultimately  kinetic."  2  And  yet  a  reduction  of  all 
energy  to  the  kinetic  form,  on  these  purely  a  priori  grounds, 
is  not  satisfactory,  since  it  is  only  by  the  aid  of  the  assump- 
tion of  energy  in  the  potential  form  that  the  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy  can  be  applied  to  the  facts.  It  is  not 
as  if  the  corpuscular  theory  had  devised  some  other  way  of 
meeting  the  difficulty.  We  are  dealing  with  a  sharp  opposition 
between  clear  deductions  from  its  theory  and  the  established 
principles  of  physics. 

We  may  conclude  that  the  attempt  to  hypostatize  matter 
to  the  exclusion  of  force  is  incapable  of  success,  and  that  the 
division  of  the  physical  object  into  two  real  principles,  matter 
and  force,  is  unsound.  Every  static  quality  displayed  by  a 
thing  may  be  explained,  and  must  be  explained  by  some  power 
which  the  thing  possesses  to  make  itself  good  in  its  system. 

At  a  higher  level,  however,  a  more  serious  type  of  objection  to 

1  Stallo,  Modern  Physics,  p.  67. 

2  Tait,  Lecture  on  Force. 

5 


66  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

the  sufficiency  of  dynamism  arises,  and  renders  necessary,  as 
I  judge,  important  modifications  of  its  doctrine.  Stall  o,  after 
urging  that  matter  per  se  is  indistinguishable  from  absolute 
nothingness,  adds  the  following:  "And,  on  the  other  hand, 
pure  force  is  equally  nothing;  for  if  we  reduce  the  mass  upon 
which  a  given  force,  however  small,  acts,  to  its  limit — or,  math- 
ematically expressed,  until  it  becomes  infinitely  small — the 
consequence  is  that  the  velocity  of  the  resulting  motion  is 
infinitely  great,  and  that  the  thing  is  neither  here  nor  there, 
but  everywhere — that  there  is  no  real  presence.  It  is  im- 
possible, therefore,  to  construct  matter  by  a  synthesis  of  forces. 
And  it  is  incorrect  to  say,  with  Bain,  that  'force  and  matter 
are  not  two  things,  but  one  thing,'  the  truth  being  that  force 
and  inertia  are  conceptual  integrants  of  matter  and  neither  is 
in  any  proper  sense  a  fact.  The  radical  fallacy  of  the  corpus- 
cular as  well  as  the  dynamical  theory  consists  in  the  delu- 
sion that  the  conceptual  elements  of  matter  can  be  grasped  as 
separate  and  real  entities.  The  corpuscular  theorists  take  the 
element  of  inertia  and  treat  it  as  real  by  itself,  while  Boscovich, 
Faraday,  and  all  those  who  define  atoms  or  molecules  as 
'centers  of  force'  seek  to  realize  the  corresponding  element, 
force,  as  an  entity  by  itself.  In  both  cases  products  of  ab- 
straction are  taken  for  kinds  of  reality."  * 

This  passage  clearly  presents  one  of  the  dangers,  or  perhaps 
shortcomings,  of  dynamical  theory,  namely,  a  conception  of 
force  so  narrow  and  poor  that  it  falls  far  short  of  supplying 
the  ground  of  all  physical  qualities.  So  long  as  force  is  defined 
simply  as  the  cause  of  motion,  the  definition  loses  sight  of  the 
particular  kind  of  motion  caused.  And  yet  we  never  expe- 
rience pure  motion.  Any  experiential  motion  has  some  defi- 
nite direction  and  velocity.  Force  may  be  as  Schelling  con- 
ceives the  absolute  productivity  of  nature  passing  over  into 
objects,  but  scientific  knowledge  tells  always  of  Cosmic  Order, 
and  force,  if  it  is  to  construct  matter,  must  bear  within  itself 

1  Stallo,  Modern  Physics,  p.  161. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  67 

the  orderliness  and  system  of  the  world.  Schelling  has  said 
that  it  must  explain  permanence;  and  if  it  is  to  do  this  the 
ordinary  dynamical  categories  are  inadequate.  The  principle 
of  change  alone  cannot  construct  a  rational  cosmos,  as 
Heraclitus  found.  The  law  which  ordered  his  flux  became 
for  Plato  the  ideal  order  of  the  universe,  and  even  the  restora- 
tion of  dynamism  by  Aristotle  did  not  dethrone  it.  To 
Leibniz,  also,  harmony  was  more  ultimate  than  dynamism,  so 
that  every  force  energized  according  to  its  own  peculiar  rela- 
tionship to  the  plan  of  the  universe.  It  is  strange  that  Kant, 
whose  theory  of  the  categories  restores  the  Platonic  conception 
of  the  synthetic  identity  of  form  in  all  scientific  knowledge, 
had  at  the  time  when  he  wrote  the'Metaphysic  of  Nature  no 
consciousness  of  the  relativity  of  dynamism  to  systematic 
order.  A  close  logical  analysis  makes  it  apparent,  however, 
that  dynamical  categories  alone  are  never  sufficient.  If  an 
atom  is  to  be  conceived  as  a  force  centre,  we  are  compelled  to 
add  at  once  that  it  is  a  centre  which  energizes  according  to  a 
characteristic  law  or  program,  and  that  the  formula  of  its 
action  is  the  most  essential  thing  about  it.  And  then  we  are 
back  upon  Aristotelian  rather  than  Heraclitic  grounds. 

This  line  of  thought  became  gradually  clear  to  Schelling, 
however,  and  was  even  more  explicit  in  the  subsequent  de- 
velopment of  idealism  by  Hegel.  Schelling  says  that  Xatiir- 
philosophie  aims  to  explain  permanence.  In  the  Introduction 
to  the  Outline  of  a  System  of  the  Philosophy  of  Mature  he 
handles  the  problem  more  fully.  He  treats  the  conditions  of 
static  order  which  arise  in  nature  as  conditions  of  Indiffer- 
ence, involving  an  equipoise  of  forces.  This  is  a  secondary 
thing,  an  effect  of  dynamism.  Deeper  than  Indifference,  how- 
ever, and  deeper  also  than  the  dynamism  which  generates  In- 
difference, is  the  order  which  governs  the  productivity  of 
nature.  The  name  which  Schelling  gives  to  this  order.  Iden- 
tity, serves  to  indicate  its  transcendence  over  the  seethe  and 
turmoil  of  the  dynamism  of  nature.  Nature  as  product  man- 


08  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

ifests  more  than  activity,  it  manifests  system  and  order.  Yes, 
but  this  requires  the  thought  that  nature  as  productivity  is 
essentially  order-imposing.  Every  dynamical  concept  will 
therefore  require  to  be  read  in  this  light. 

The  difficulty  which  Schelling  experienced  in  working  out 
the  conception  of  an  Absolute  Identity  led  to  Hegel's  formu- 
lation. With  him  the  Absolute  is  more  distinctly  conceived 
as  rich  with  differential  detail,  but  all  members  are  held  within 
the  clutch  of  the  system-ordaining  One.  And  now,  the  Hegelian 
Logic  sublates  the  dynamical  categories  as  truly  as  it  does  the 
categories  of  corpuscular  mechanics,  or  even  of  common  sense. 
True,  they  are  higher  in  the  scale,  and  carry  a  richer  insight 
than  the  others  mentioned.  Yet  not  much  can  be  claimed  for 
them  on  that  account ;  for  they  belong,  after  all,  to  the  second 
only  of  the  three  great  stages  of  philosophical  insight,  the  doc- 
trine of  Essence.  They  have  not  attained  to  the  explicit  con- 
sciousness of  the  Notion,  the  immanent  ideal  order  of  the 
universe.  They  fall  short,  therefore,  of  the  characteristic  in- 
sight of  idealism;  and  however  valuable  they  may  be  as  means 
for  tearing  thought  away  from  the  cruder  types  of  realistic 
metaphysic,  they  must  be  confessed  to  be  inadequate  to  the 
thoroughgoing  treatment  of  any  fact  whatever.  Idealism  is 
not  engaged  in  teaching  that  nature  is  the  manifestation  of 
"blind  force."  That  doctrine  accords  better  with  realism, 
especially  if  the  latter  be  of  a  "transfigured"  type.  Things 
are  the  unfolding  of  reason,  plan,  concept ;  and  whatever  place 
activity  may  take  in  their  generation,  the  philosophical  ac- 
count of  the  activity  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  plan  and 
order  which  give  meaning  and  rationality  to  the  process.  In 
the  realm  of  physical  concepts,  the  elements  of  order  are  in- 
terpreted through  sucli  concepts  as  mass,  inertia,  and  other 
mechanical  categories,  as  well  as  being  bound  up  in  every 
thought  more  distinctly  dynamical.  It  is  only  a  revised  dy- 
namism, then,  that  can  hope  to  cope  with  the  entire  range  of 
physical  theory. 


THE     PHYSICS    OF     IDEALISM.  09 

The  general  result  of  our  discussion  of  matter  as  a  force- 
p rod  net,  then,  has  been  to  show  that  the  construction  of  mat- 
ter from  two  forces  has  not  sufficient  objective  warrant,  but 
is  in  danger  of  affording  a  purely  subjective  analysis ;  and  that 
dynamism  in  any  form,  although  helpful  to  idealism  against 
its  traditional  adversaries,  is  not  ultimate  idealism,  and  is  not 
by  itself  sufficient  to  the  thorough  speculative  treatment  of 
physical  fa<-ts.  The  only  force  which  can  satisfy  the  demand 
is  a  force  which  takes,  up  into  its  definition  relations  of  uni- 
verse order. 

F.  Gravitation  as  a  Systematizing  Factor. 

In  his  treatment  of  gravitation  Schelling  breaks  away  from 
the  doctrine  supported  by  Kant  in  the  Metaphysic  of  Nature. 
We  have  thus  far  spoken  as  if  for  Schelling  two  forces  in  oppo- 
sition were  sufficient  for  the  construction  of  matter.  In  his 
earlier  works  that  is  the  case.  When  he  wrote  the  Outlines. 
however,  he  had  been  led  to  see  that  Kant's  attractive  force  did 
not  furnish  an  adequate  account  of  gravitation.  At  that  time 
he  still  held  that  attraction  and  repulsion  were  sufficient  for 
the  construction  of  matter,  so  long  as  one  regards  it  merely 
as  that  which  fills  space,  and  that  with  these  dynamical  theory 
\voiild  be  satisfied.  When  we  come  to  mechanics,  however,  and 
regard  matter  as  in  motion  and  interaction,  we  must  have  a 
third  force  to  bind  all  physical  nature  together.  He  regarded 
gravitation  at  that  time  not  as  something  essential  to  the  very 
existence  of  matter,  but  rather  as  necessary  for  its  interaction. 
In  the  Trunxrenilcntfil  l<l<<ilixut,  however,  gravitation  becomes 
the  construing  agent  by  virtue  of  which  attraction  and  repul- 
sion are  held  in  opposition,  thus  making  possible  the  existence 
of  matter.  It  is  then  of  more  vital  importance  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  physical  object  than  the  other  two  forces.  As  this 
development  of  Schelling's  thought  indicates  an  effort  to  supply 
in  some  degree  the  deficiencies  in  dynamical  theory  discussed 
in  our  last  section,  it  calls  for  a  brief  consideration. 


70  THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  grounds  of  Schelling's  criticism  of 
Kant  upon  this  point,  it  will  be  necessary  to  recur  to  Kant's 
view  of  gravitation.  The  latter  had  maintained  that  "the 
possibility  of  matter  requires  an  attractive  force  as  its  second 
real  fundamental  force."  *  The  reason  for  this  assertion  is 
the  familiar  one  that  expansion  cannot  limit  itself,  and  must 
therefore  dissipate  matter  to  infinity  unless  checked  by  an 
opposed  attraction.  In  this  Schelling  agreed  with  him,  but 
became  more  cautious  after  he  had  noted  the  paralogism  into 
which  it  led  Kant.  Accordingly  he  rejects  the  name  attractive 
force  in  his  later  works,  substituting  for  it,  at  least  when  he 
wishes  to  be  precise,  the  term  retarding  force.  The  correction 
is  significant  and  well  founded,  since  the  only  reason  for  as- 
suming the  second  force  was  to  secure  a  principle  upon  which 
we  may  explain  the  retarding  of  expansion.  We  have  seen 
that  our  inability  to  explain  this  retarding  force  from  the 
mere  concept  of  expansion  does  not  justify  us  in  supposing  that 
the  accessory  principle  which  for  ideal  purposes  we  bring  in 
is  in  fact  distinct  from  the  principle  at  work  in  repulsion. 
Kant  says,  however,  that  attraction  is  the  second  "wesentliche 
Grundkraft"  of  matter.  Schelling  admits  that  the  reason 
given  by  Kant  for  holding  attraction  as  real  as  repulsion  is 
insufficient,  but,  as  has  been  shown,  finds  grounds  of  his  own 
for  maintaining  the  same  conclusion.  For  Schelling,  how- 
ever, who  is  here  more  consistent  than  Kant,  attraction  is  only 
a  negative  force,  it  merely  retards  expansion. 

On  Kant's  view,  attraction  is  distinguished  from  repulsion 
by  the  manner  in  which  it  works.  Repulsion,  working  out- 
wardly from  a  centre,  acts  continuously  up  to  the  point  at 
which  it  is  checked.  Beyond  that  point  it  does  not  act,  simply 
because  it  has  been  checked.  One  might  suppose  that  it  would 
work  even  beyond  .the  point  at  which  it  became  so  weakened 
as  to  come  to  an  equilibrium  with  its  opposite,  although  of 
course  owing  to  the  preponderance  of  attraction  outside  the 

1Kant,  Werke,  ed.  Kosenkranz,  Bd.  V,  S.  358. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  71 

periphery  of  limitation  it  could  have  little  effect.     No  suffi- 
cient reason  is  given  either  by  Kant  or  Schelling  why  repulsion 
cannot  act  at  a  distance,  and  according  to  the  theories  of" 
Boscovich  and  v.  Hartmann  such  action  does  take  place. 

Kant  urges,  however,  that  attraction  must  act  at  a  distance, 
since  the  making  definite  of  any  given  quantity  of  matter,  and 
therefore  the  establishment  of  things  as  distant  from  one  an- 
other at  all,  is  a  result  of  the  action  of  attraction.  Contact, 
then,  presupposes  a  previous  attraction  which  made  the  bodies 
definite  in  form  and  mass.  But  since  contact  depends  upon 
the  previous  action  of  attraction,  we  cannot  suppose  that  the 
possibility  of  attraction  depends  upon  contact.  It  must  be 
prior  to  contact,  and  act  immediately  at  a  distance. 

It  ought  to  be  noticed,  however,  that  before  contact  can  take 
place  two  things  are  necessary.  In  the  first  place,  bodies  must 
exist  having  definite  determinations  and  boundaries.  On  the 
reasoning  of  Kant  and  Schelling,  this  condition  depends  upon 
the  action  of  attractive  or  retarding  force.  But  now  in  the 
second  place,  bodies  must  do  more  than  exist — they  must  be 
so  drawn  or  thrown  together  in  space  that  their  boundaries 
may  touch.  This  last  condition  is  not  necessarily  satisfied  by 
the  action  of  a  force,  the  only  reason  for  assuming  which  was 
to  explain  the  definite  limitation  of  bodies.  It  does  not  follow 
from  the  analysis  of  the  idea  of  a  particle  of  matter  in  a 
static  condition  that  all  such  particles  must  gravitate  towards 
one  another.  We  have  to  learn  it  first  from  the  fact  that 
they  do. 

Kant  declares  that  attraction  not  only  acts  at  a  distance 
but  that  it  is  a  penetrating  force;  that  is,  by  means  of  it  one 
body  exerts  force  upon  the  parts  of  another  body,  immediately, 
and  without  regard  to  intervening  bodies.  He  supposes  that 
this  property  follows  from  the  concept  of  attraction,  and  his 
proof  of  it  consists  in  showing  that  attraction  can  be  de- 
stroyed neither  by  intervening  bodies  nor  by  extent  of  space. 
That  the  attraction  of  one  body  is  able  to  seize  upon  the  mass 


72  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

of  another,  and  draw  it  toward  its  own  centre,  he  assumes 
without  question. 

At  this  point  Schelling  joins  issue.  He  says,  "Kant,  in  his 
Metaphysical  Basis  of  the  Natural  Sciences,  calls  the  attractive 
force  a  penetrative  force,  but  he  does  this  only  for  the  reason 
that  he  regards  the  attractive  force  as  already  gravity,  whereby 
also  he  requires  only  two  forces  for  the  construction  of  matter, 
while  we  deduce  three  as  necessary.  The  attractive  force 
thought  purely,  that  is,  as  a  mere  factor  of  construction,  is  to 
be  sure  a  force  which  works  immediately  at  a  distance,  but  not 
a  penetrative  force,  since  there  is  nothing  to  penetrate  where 
nothing  exists.  It  first  gets  its  penetrative  properties  from 
the  fact  that  it  is  taken  up  into  gravitation.  Gravitation  itself 
is  not  identical  with  attractive  force,  although  the  latter  neces- 
sarily enters  into  it.'' 1 

The  ground  of  Schelling's  dissent  from  Kant  appears  more 
clearly  from  another  passage :  "Now  in  order  to  explain  how 
the  production  of  nature  is  originally  directed  upon  something 
definite^  there  must  indeed  be  something  negative  assumed  in 
every  infinitely  productive  activity,  which  negative,  if  all  pro- 
ductive activity  of  nature  is  only  an  evolution  from  one  orig- 
inal involution,  must  be  the  very  principle  which  retards  the 
evolution  of  nature.  In  short,  there  must  be  an  original  re- 
tarding principle.  To  explain  this  retarding  principle,  to  show 
why  nature  develops  itself  with  a  finite  rapidity,  will,  it  is 
true,  appear  as  the  highest  task  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature. 
But  only  on  the  lowest  standpoint,  that  of  the  consideration 
of  the  product  as  mere  space-filling,  can  that  retarding  prin- 
ciple appear  as  attractive  force.  And  now  moreover  this  prin- 
ciple serves  only  to  explain  the  finite,  the  determinate  in  gen- 
eral in  natural  production,  but  not  to  explain  how  one  object 
comes  to  be  finite  in  relation  to  another,  how  for  instance  the 
earth  is  heavy  towards  the  sun."  2 

1  Schelling-,  Sammtliche  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  444. 

2  Ibid,  S.  102. 


THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM.  73 

Gravitation,  then,  cannot  be  explained  from  the  idea  of  mat- 
ter as  that  which  by  virtue  of  moving  forces  fills  space.  Schel- 
ling  develops  a  theory  of  gravitation  which  is  to  supplant 
the  hailstone  theory  of  Le  Sage  and  the  two-forces  theory  of 
Kant.  For  him  the  nature  and  origin  of  gravitation  must  be 
considered  in  connection  with  the  development  of  the  sidereal 
and  solar  systems. 

Gravitation  is  an  immaterial  principle,  as  Kant  and  the 
Newtonians  asserted,  not  a  material  principle,  as  Le  Sage 
maintained.  It  is  a  force  by  means  of  which  the  whole  uni- 
verse is  bound  together,  and  constituted  one.  It  therefore 
pervades  all  matter,  and  extends  throughout  space  to  infinity. 
Ultimately,  then,  it  has  its  source  and  ground  in  the  unity  of 
nature  as  subject.  In  its  application  to  the  particular  bodies 
in  a  definite  system,  however,  it  is  mediated  by  the  command- 
ing central  body  of  that  system.  Schelling  develops  the  idea 
of  a  sphere  of  affinity  which  is  ruled  by  a  body  of  commanding 
mass,  and  within  which  smaller  bodies  are  subjected  to  power 
exerted  by  the  central  mass.  This  sphere  of  affinity  is  analo- 
gous to  the  field  of  force  determined  by  the  magnet.  Just  as 
in  the  magnet's  field  of  force  iron  filings  arrange  themselves 
in  definite  positions  with  regard  to  one  another,  so  in  the 
sphere  of  affinity  of  the  sun  all  parts  of  the  solar  system  grav- 
itate towards  one  another. 

The  source  of  this  universal  gravitation  cannot  be  found 
merely  in  the  bodies  themselves.  "There  must  certainly  rule 
throughout  the  whole  of  nature  one  force,  by  which  nature 
is  preserved  in  its  identity,  a  force  which  we  have  not  yet  de- 
rived, but  to  which  we  see  ourselves  now  for  the  first  time 
driven."  *  Such  a  force  cannot  be  merely  the  mode  of  action 
of  distinct  bodies,  it  must  be  also  something  more  universal. 
Now  Schelling  maintains  that  "what  holds  together  a  mass 
as  a  mere  aggregate  of  bodies  existing  beside  and  beneath  one 
another  must  be  such  an  influence  of  a  mass  outside  them  as 

Schelling,  Summtliche  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  105. 


74  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

gives  all  their  parts  a  tendency  towards  one  another/' x  This 
mutual  tendency  of  all  parts  towards  one  another,  since  it 
always  remains  a  tendency,  and  never  attains  to  union,  can  be 
really  explained  only  as  a  common  tendency  of  all  to  union 
with  a  third.  Their  reciprocal  tendency  towards  one  another, 
then,  would  be  only  apparent,  just  as  the  magnet  gives  iron 
filings  an  orderly  arrangement  with  regard  to  one  another. 
This  common  tendency  to  union  with  a  third  is  then  the  bind- 
ing principle  which  holds  all  parts  together.  This  must  neces- 
sarily be  something  outside  the  mass,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
earth,  for  instance,  must  be  the  sun. 

In  this  way  the  sun  influences  all  bodies  in  the  solar  system, 
its  sphere  of  affinity,  and  produces  the  appearance  of  a  recip- 
rocal gravitation.  The  power  of  the  sun  to  do  this,  however, 
is  merely  delegated.  The  fact  that  the  particles  of  the  earth 
gravitate  towards  the  sun  can  be  explained  only  by  a  third 
mass  which  by  its  sphere  of  affinity  governs  the  sun.  Thus  we 
have  an  absolute  despotism,  in  which  the  sun  is,  to  be  sure, 
the  viceroy  of  the  one  absolute  dictator  so  far  as  concerns  the 
solar  system,  but  it  really  only  mediates  to  the  bodies  of  the 
solar  system  a  unifying  power  derived  from  the  sources  of 
nature  itself. 

It  remained  for  Schelling  to  show  in  what  relation  this  uni- 
versal binding  force  of  gravitation  stood  to  the  other  forces  in 
the  constitution  of  matter.  Like  the  others,  gravitation  also 
must  be  "transcen dentally  deduced."  Now  it  had  been  shown 
that  perception  implies  two  opposed  mental  activities,  but  im- 
plies also  an  activity  really  more  important  than  the  other  two, 
by  means  of  which  the  latter  are  synthesized  within  one  con- 
sciousness. This  third  activity  is  called  by  Schelling  the  pro- 
ductive perception,  by  Fichte  the  productive  imagination. 
Taking  up  into  itself  as  factors  the  real  and  ideal  activities, 
the  functioning  of  productive  perception  forms  the  true  cord 
of  conscious  experience.  Now  just  as  repulsion  and  attraction 

1  Schelling,  S'dmmtliche  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  106. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  75 

had  for  So-helling  represented  ideal  and  real  activities,  grav- 
itation represents  the  power  by  which  the  two  are  synthesized. 
"•fust  as  the  activity  which  is  checked  within  the  limit  and 
the  activity  which  goes  out  beyond  the  limit  to  infinity  are 
only  the  factors  of  productive  perception,  so  also  repulsive  and 
attractive  force,  which  are  separated  only  by  their  common 
boundary,  are  only  the  factors  for  the  construction  of  matter, 
but  not  the  constructing  principle  itself.  This  latter  can  only 
be  a  third  force  which  synthesizes  the  two  and  answers  to  the 
synthetic  activity  .of  the  Ego  in  perception.  Only  by  means 
of  this  third  synthetic  activity  was  it  comprehensible  how  the 
two  activities  could  be  posited  as  absolutely  opposed  to  one 
another  in  one  and  the  same  subject.  The  force  which  corre- 
sponds to  this  activity  in  the  object  will  therefore  be  that  by 
means  of  which  those  two  really  opposed  forces  become  posited 
in  the  same  subject/' a 

We  have  already  seen  that  this  line  of  argument  in  Schelling 
possesses  little  value.  It  is  significant,  however,  as  showing 
in  what  light  he  regarded  gravitation.  Kant  had  attempted 
to  render  easy  the  conception  of  an  immaterial  principle  of 
gravitation  by  showing  that  such  a  principle,  in  the  form  of  at- 
traction, is  essential  to  the  existence  of  a  single  particle  of 
matter.  Schelling  points  out  with  great  clearness  and  success 
that  this  attempt  must  result  in  failure.  His  criticism  of  Kant 
on  this  point  is  decisive.  He  shows  that  gravitation  must  be 
a  cosmic  principle,  not  to  be  inferred  from  the  concept  of  a 
piece  of  matter  at  rest,  a  concept  which  abstracts  from  all  rela- 
tions to  other  bodies. 

It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  the  theory  which  Schelling 
offers  in  place  of  Kant's  view  is  of  great  value  as  an  explana- 
tion of  gravitation.  It  does  little  more  than  to  reassert  in 
general  terms  the  truth  that  gravitation  does  obtain,  adding 
that  it  is  an  immaterial  principle  by  means  of  which  one  body 
attracts  another  at  a  distance.  This  is  no  more  than  the  New- 

1  Schelling,  Sammtlicfie  Werke,  Bd.  Ill,  S.  443-444. 


76  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

tonians  had  said,  but  their  view  had  been  confessedly  inad- 
equate. 

But  the  most  significant  thing  about  Schelling's  treatment 
of  gravitation  is  the  fact  that  it  indicates  the  point  at  which 
a  physical  dynamism  of  the  type  offered  by  Kant  logically 
passes  over  into  a  deeper  recognition  of  a  systematizing  order 
to  which  each  material  particle  is  organic.  This  thoughjt  in 
some  form  is  unavoidable,  and  while  physical  theory  must  take 
it  in  an  abstract  form,  without  elaborating  or  analyzing  it  as 
thoroughly  as  does  metaphysics,  yet  it  must  appear  in  the 
philosophy  of  physics.  Schelling's  achievement  has  been 
scarcely  more  than  that  of  indicating  a  problem — perhaps  not 
even  that,  in  very  clear  form.  Certainly  his  own  discussion  is 
inadequate  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  gravitation.  One 
might  infer  that  empirical  research  alone  can  throw  light  upon 
this  problem,  as  upon  every  problem  of  the  theory  of  matter. 
The  remarkably  backward  condition  of  the  doctrine  of  gravita- 
tion in  modern  physics,  however,  in  the  midst  of  an  enormous 
mass  of  empirical  material,  helps  us  to  recognize  that  the  prob- 
lem differs  somewhat  from  ordinary  physical  problems.  The 
familiar  categories  of  physics  are  not  adequate  to  cope  with 
it,  since  it  involves  something  which  these  categories  all  pre- 
suppose. One  may  expect  that  the  problem  will  be  attacked 
one  day  with  great  keenness  of  analysis  and  with  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  physical  fact,  in  such  a  way  as  to  yield  gratifying  re- 
sults. Such  results,  however,  can  hardly  fail  to  modify  our 
present  conceptions  of  matter,  by  dwelling  upon  the  relation 
of  each  particle  to  a  systematizing  whole,  and  showing  the 
manner  in  which  this  relationship  becomes  effective.  It  is 
true  that  there  are  deeper  and  more  significant  forms  of  sys- 
tematic relation  than  gravitation  can  present;  but  until  we 
have  gained  some  fuller  insight  into  this  we  do  ill  in  passing 
it  over  so  lightly  as  is  generally  the  case.  The  problem  is  a 
real  one  and  an  intelligible  one.  It  is  not  being  treated  by 
physics — it  seems  to  fall  outside  physics.  In  equal  degree  it 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  77 

falls  outside  philosophy.  Yet  it  is  on  the  borderland  of  the 
two  and  the  completion  of  either  physics  or  philosophy  will 
require  its  more  thorough  handling. 

It  is  true,  of  course,  that  for  idealism  the  only  real  systema- 
tizing factor  is  the  Absolute.  But  this  thought  comes  in  only 
when  we  ask  for  the  complete  meaning  of  the  order  in  the 
world.  The  sciences,  read  that  order  at  various  levels,  and 
physics,  in  particular,  reads  it  at  such  a  level  that  the  defini- 
tion of  physical  systems  as  gravitational  masses  becomes  of 
rational  importance.  It  is  by  the  appreciation  of  the  way  in 
which  a  theoretical  analysis  of  matter  leads  inevitably  from 
the  dynamism  of  the  parts  to  a  recognition  of  the  dynamical 
influence  of  the  systematizing  whole,  and  the  necessity  of  stat- 
ing that  influence  in  intelligible  and  workable  terms,  that  one 
may  see  the  significance  of  Schelling's  treatment  of  gravita- 
tion. 


78  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CONCLUSION. 

It  is  impossible,  of  course,  to  treat  exhaustively  in  a  mono- 
graph the  interrelations  of  physical  science  and  a  world-view 
like  idealism.  The  entire  development  of  the  discussion  after 
Schelling  must  be  left  out  of  our. explicit  notice,  although  we 
have  attempted  to  make  use  of  that  development  in  our  analy- 
sis and  criticism  of  Schelling.  Many  interesting  chapters  by 
the  author  of  the  Naturphilosophie  himself  must  also  be  omit- 
ted, entailing  a  loss  which  is  particularly  significant  in  regard 
to  the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  atomic  theory. 

The  limits  of  a  monograph  do  not  forbid,  however,  an  esti- 
mate of  the  spirit  of  idealism,  and  its  bearing  upon  the  general 
view  of  the  material  world  which  has  been  organized  into 
modern  physics.  It  is  this  inquiry  to  which  our  interest  is 
here  restricted,  and  which  we  now  wish  to  sum  up  in  general 
.terms. 

Two  things  seem  to  have  stood  out  throughout  the  entire 
course  of  the  investigation :  in  the  first  place,  the  legitimacy, 
and  even  insistency,  of  such  a  transvaluation  of  physical  values 
as  was  attempted  in  the  work  of  the  great  idealistic  philoso- 
phers of  a  century  ago;  and  in  the  second  place,  the  want  of 
success  on  their  part  in  making  good  the  particular  form  of 
transvaluation  which  they  proposed. 

The  legitimacy  of  the  problem  will  be  denied,  of  course,  by 
all  thinkers  who  regard  the  work  of  philosophical  criticism 
as  at  all  times  baseless  and  impertinent.  Such  thinkers  are 
accustomed  to  regard  knowledge  given  in  scientific  form  as 
the  highest  and  most  perfect  to  which  man  can  attain,  and  as 
neither  demanding  nor  permitting  any  critical  revision  at  the 


THE    PHYSICS    OF     IDEALISM.  79 

hands  of  the  professed  student  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  or 
of  metaphysics.  With  such  it  is  not  necessary  to  reason  here, 
since  the  mass  of  discussion  in  contemporary  epistemology  is 
directed  against  precisely  this  position,  the  dogmatism  of 
science. 

With  thinkers  not  under  the  sway  of  an  unphilosophical  dog- 
matism, hoAvever,  the  conviction  is  general  that  the  sciences 
of  nature,  although  highly  organized  and  successful,  are  lim- 
ited in  a  certain  characteristic  manner.  Their  very  success, 
and  their  power  to  still  farther  amplify  their  success,  have 
been  purchased  at  the  expense  of  a  very  definite  limitation  of 
their  problem.  Certain  ways  of  looking  at  things  and  cate- 
gories of  interpretation  have  been  taken  for  explanatory  pur- 
poses, because  very  successful  at  a  certain  level.  The  entire 
range  of  fact  susceptible  of  illumination  by  some  one  category 
of  interpretation,  or  some  closely  connected  group  of  cate- 
gories, becomes  then  the  subject  matter  of  one  science.  Facts 
not  readily  amenable  to  those  categories  simply  fall  outside 
the  science,  although  they  may  be  more  or  less  closely  related. 

Now  it  results  from  this  organization  of  knowledge  that  the 
treatment  of  its  subject  matter  given  by  any  special  science  is 
abstract.  The  science  treats  the  facts;  but  it  treats  them  from 
a  special  point  of  view  and  for  special  interests.  It  does  not 
treat  them  in  their  full  import  and  meaning,  that  is,  in  their 
full  truth.  What  a  given  science  offers  is  true,  no  doubt,  if 
the  work  of  the  science  has  been  properly  done;  yet  if  it  is 
taken  as  tlte  truth,  it  becomes  misleading  by  reason  of  its  ab- 
stractness.  The  categories  in  which  any  special  science  moves 
readily  are  too  cheap  and  partial  to  express  the  truth  of  any 
fact,  since  every  fact  embodies  the  universal  system  of  the 
world.  Science,  by  reason  of  the  necessary  abstractness  of  its 
mode  of  treatment,  puts  forward  only  half-truths ;  and  these 
half-truths,  if  carelessly  or  uncritically  handled,  are  in  great 
danger  of  becoming  falsehoods.  In  large  measure  the  defect 
of  any  given  science  is  that  of  the  incomplete  and  abstract 


80  THE    PHYSICS    OP    IDEALISM. 

character  of  its  constitutive  categories,  and  therefore  of  its 
possible  insight;  in  part,  however,  this  carries  with  it  the 
further  fact  that  some  aspects  of  the  assumptions  taken  by  the 
science  are  simply  not  true,  but  misrepresent  the  real.  They 
are  valuable,  then,  chiefly  for  their  power  to  aid  in  freeing  the 
subject  matter  from  perplexing  relations.  Accordingly,  the 
view  of  affairs  presented  by  any  science  can  never  be  taken 
as  ultimate.  It  needs  a  peculiar  type  of  revision,  by  means  of 
which  the  defect  arising  from  the  necessary  abstraction  of 
thought  may  be  supplemented. 

To  some  degree  the  revision  is  carried  out  by  the  discussion 
of  the  subject  matter  by  cognate  sciences.  As  the  system  of 
the  sciences  approaches  more  nearly  to  completion,  this  cor- 
rection may  be  expected  to  be  more  efficacious  than  it  is  today. 
At  present,  however,  the  chasm  between  the  different  sciences 
is  too  great  to  be  effectively  bridged  in  this  way.  We  are  not 
able  to  make  one  set  of  abstractions  fit  nicely  into  another, 
in  such  wise  that  a  philosophy  of  high  solidarity  results.  Even 
certain  sciences  which  seem  to  do  so  reveal  under  critical 
analysis  great  chasms  and  faults.  In  any  case,  however,  the 
genuine  union  of  the  sciences  will  require  a  modification  of 
those  outstanding  conceptions  which  now,  in  order  to  furnish 
greater  distinctness,  have  been  made  harsh  in  their  antago- 
nisms toward  other  elements  in  the  scheme  of  truth.  In  any 
case,  that  is,  a  transvaluation  of  scientific  values  must  be  ef- 
fected, even  if  it  be  carried  out  by  the  sciences  themselves  as 
they  approach  completion. 

Philosophy  has  long  asserted  its  claim  to  exercise  an  espe- 
cially significant  function  in  the  work  of  unifying  the  sciences, 
although  this  claim  is  often  rejected  by  the  scientist.  Philos- 
ophy performs  this  function  by  pointing  out  the  central  fact 
in  the  nature  of  scientific  synthesis,  the  fact  that  it  is  a  syn- 
thesis within  conscious  experience,  and  that  all  concept  build- 
ing is  therefore  relative  to  the  unity  of  experience.  Philosophy 
also  aids  the  mental  sciences  to  establish  their  relative  rights, 


THE    THYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  81 

which  would  otherwise  be  jeopardized  by  the  more  objective 
sciences.  But  the  main  significance  of  philosophy,  after  all, 
in  the  matter  of  a  synthesis  of  the  sciences,  is  its  demonstration 
of  the  limitations  of  inadequate  and  one-sided  conceptions.  In 
this  field  it  has  special  power,  and  the  rigor  and  keenness  of 
its  dialectic  surpass  anything  which  science  is  accustomed  to 
bring  to  bear  in  this  interest. 

The  defect  of  the  work  of  philosophy  is  apparent  at  once :  it 
is  not  strongly  constructive.  It  can  furnish  nothing  but  an 
ideal  of  synthesis,  a  conception  of  truth  and  system.  Beyond 
that  its  function  is  purely  that  of  the  police  power.  Philos- 
ophy by  itself  can  throw  little  light  upon  any  of  the  more 
concrete  problems  in  the  synthesis  of  the  sciences.  The  gen- 
uine principles  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  are  compatible  with 
any  genuine  knowledge  whatever,  and  do  not  reinforce  this 
doctrine  rather  than  that,  so  long  as  both  doctrines  are  prop- 
erly drawn.  In  short,  a  philosophy  which  has  maintained  as 
philosophy  its  aloofness  from  the  special  problems  of  science, 
and  driven  its  business  as  the  metaphysics  of  knowledge  in 
general,  has  no  language  with  which  to  discuss  intelligibly  the 
real  questions  of  the  larger  meaning  of  the  truths  which  are 
abstractly  handled  in  science.  It  is  too  far  away;  it  cannot 
descend  into  the  details  of  the  discussion.  Not  only  do  its 
students  want  the  special  training  required — that  may  be 
corrected.  Rather,  philosophy  itself,  as  a  separate  discipline, 
wants  the  language,  the  points  of  intellectual  attachment,  and 
the  competence  for  the  task.  It  results  that  philosophical  crit- 
icism directed  upon  scientific  problems  too  often  takes  the 
form  of  mere  faultfinding,  unable  to  suggest  a  better  concep- 
tion in  place  of  the  one  under  criticism. 

It  is  true  that  philosophy  should  leave  to  science  the  right 
to  pursue  its  own  course,  to  develop  its  own  conceptions  in  a 
purely  objective  manner,  independently  of  metaphysical  theory. 
The  value  of  the  separation  of  philosophy  from  science,  for  the 
purpose  of  the  better  handling  of  questions  in  each  field,  is  not 
6 


82  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

to  be  denied,  and  when  that  separation  has  been  made,  science 
is  to  be  driven  as  science,  and  not  as  a  mixture  of  science  and 
speculation.  Within  the  field  of  science,  then,  philosophy 
should  assert  no  claim  to  displace  one  conception  in  the  interest 
of  another  which  has  greater  speculative  favor.  Science  may 
be  abstract  and  one-sided,  but  it  is  preeminently  clear,  close 
to  fact,  and  manageable.  It  should  be  permitted  to  build 
without  interference  the  structure  which  its  virtues  and  its 
methods  warrant.  The  blending  of  science  with  philosophy 
sacrifices  the  clearness  and  coherency  of  science,  and,  if  it  is 
offered  as  a  substitute  to  displace  the  body  of  the  sciences,  can 
yield  only  confusion. 

At  the  same  time,  a  blending  of  science  and  philosophy  must 
be  worked  out;  for  only  thus  can  the  great  intellectual  prob- 
lem of  our  time  be  solved.  We  need  a  synthesis  of  our  knowl- 
edges; the  extreme  specialization  and  decentralization  of  our 
intellectual  world  demands  correction.  Science  itself  cannot 
furnish  that  synthesis,  because  of  the  dogmatic  harshness  and 
mutual  repulsion  of  many  of  the  hypostatized  abstractions  in 
terms  of  which  it  moves;  although,  as  the  scientist  notes  the 
implications  of  unified  system  within  the  body  of  knowledge 
which  he  is  constructing  he  continually  deludes  himself  and 
others  with  the  mocking  hope  that  a  synthetic  view  is  about 
to  be  attained  by  the  empirical  sciences  as  such.  He  has  failed 
to  note  that  the  difficulty  lies  not  simply  in  the  lacunae  of 
our  knowledge,  but  especially  in  the  abstractness  and  mutual 
antagonisms  of  the  constitutive  categories  of  our  specialties. 
And  philosophy  conceived  simply  as  the  science  of  knowledge 
cannot  furnish  the  genuine  synthetic  view,  however  important 
its  function  in  that  regard,  because  it  cannot  discuss  in  detail 
the  structure,  inward  relationships,  and  contents  of  our 
knowledges. 

Thus  the  call  becomes  urgent  for  such  a  reconstruction  of 
our  sciences  as  Schelling  conceived  under  the  name  of  specu- 
lative physics,  or  more  broadly  considered,  of  Naturphilosophie. 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  83 

It  should  exist  alongside  of  science,  in  no  wise  displacing  it  or 
altering  the  course  of  scientific  advance.  It  would  renounce  en- 
tirely the  effort  at  discover}-  which  is  proper  to  science,  and 
would  take  the  duly  authenticated  results  of  science  without 
debate.  It  would  restore,  however,  the  relation  to  philosophy 
from  which  science  abstracts  as  much  as  possible,  and  would 
also  aim  to  bring  into  closer  accord  the  viewpoints  of  the 
special  sciences.  Working  from  this  standpoint  and  in  this 
interest,  it  would  attempt  a  transvaluation  of  scientific  values, 
by  which  the  abstractness  of  science  would  be  overcome  so  far 
as  may  be,  and  the  whole  system  of  knowledge  interpreted 
in  conscious  relation  to  the  concrete  universal  which  vivifies 
that  system. 

It  does  not  admit  of  doubt  that  the  results  issuing  from 
such  a  treatment  of  our  knowledge  will  fall  far  short,  in  point 
of  coherence  and  clearness,  of  the  splendid  structure  of  our 
special  sciences.  If  proposed  in  place  of  the  latter  it  would  be 
chimerical  and  absurd,  and  its  success  in  displacing  them,  if 
such  a  thing  were  conceivable,  would  be  an  almost  unmitigated 
evil.  But  there  remains  a  certain  field  which  neither  our  con- 
temporary sciences  nor  our  contemporary  philosophy  properly 
cultivate,  in  which  much  must  be  done  if  we  are  to  learn  the 
larger  meaning  of  our  enormous  empirical  accumulations  of 
today.  The  warrant  for  the  existence  of  a  metaphysical  re- 
valuation of  the  structure  of  physical  science  is  purely  specu- 
lative, but  speculative  in  that  better  sense  in  which  the  central 
motive  of  all  genuine  science  is  speculative. 

Such  a  Naturphttosophie  is  of  course  not  entirely  non-ex- 
istent today.  We  have  excellent  philosophical  criticisms  and 
estimations  of  various  fundamental  doctrines  in  science.  The 
range  and  meaning  of  atomism,  for  instance,  has  been  search- 
ing ly  discussed.  We  fail,  however,  in  point  of  thorough  sys- 
tematic treatment  over  the  entire  field.  The  work  is  stu- 
pendous, of  course,  and  since  the  downfall  of  the  Hegelian  phi- 
osophy  in  Germany  there  has  been  a  want  of  confidence  in 


84  THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM. 

systematic  effort  in  philosophy.  The  history  of  philosophy 
and  epistemological  criticism  have  absorbed  the  attention  of 
such  as  work  in  this  field.  It  is  greatly  to  be  desired,  how- 
ever, that  men  examine  more  carefully  the  nature  of  the  prob- 
lem attempted  by  Naturphilosoplue,  and  see  if  it  is  not  sound, 
genuine,  and  even  insistent;  and  then  inquire  further,  to  see 
if  the  reasons  for  its  relative  failure  a  hundred  years  ago  are 
such  as  to  interpose  an  insuperable  barrier  against  any  success 
for  the  undertaking  in  the  changed  conditions  of  our  modern 
time. 

Is  it  not  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  efforts  of  a  brilliant  but 
erratic  writer  of  that  unscientific  time,  trained  largely  in 
theology  and  Fichtean  Wisscnschaftslehre,  and  writing  him- 
self out  before  the  age  of  thirty  under  the  pressure  of  the  neces- 
sity of  preparing  material  for  his  academic  classes,  material 
which  was  immediately  published  almost  without  change — is  it 
not  absurd  that  these  should  stand  as  the  high  water  mark  of 
the  speculative  treatment  of  natural  science?  And  ought  the 
imperfections  and  want  of  information  and  of  caution  which 
are  apparent  in  Schelling's  hastily  written  pages  to  be  allowed 
to  discredit  throughout  all  time  for  fair  and  thoughtful  men 
the  elaboration  of  the  problem  connected  with  his  name?  No 
doubt  the  work  is  a  difficult  one,  and  will  require  the  co- 
operation and  criticism  of  hundreds  of  men,  and  the  rich  in- 
formation provided  by  the  entire  mass  of  science  rather  than 
by  one  precocious  brain,  but  in  any  case  the  problem  should 
not  be  prejudiced  by  faulty  execution  on  the  part  of  its  first 
significant  student. 

For  not  only  is  the  problem  legitimate.  It  is  also  true  that 
the  nature  of  the  relative  failure  of  these  writers  is  such  as 
to  prompt  to  new  effort.  We  have  shown  that  Kant  and  Schel- 
ling  blended  good  work  with  bad  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate 
the  problem,  and  perhaps  the  general  direction  of  the  solution, 
but  by  no  means  to  recommend  the  particular  doctrines  which 
they  developed.  We  have  seen,  however,  that  the  theories 


THE    PHYSICS    OF    IDEALISM.  85 

which  they  maintained,  and  which  have  since  appeared  so  im- 
perfect and  unsatisfactory  in  the  light  either  of  logical  analy- 
sis or  of  scientific  advance,  were  in  part  not  legitimate  or 
necessary  consequences  of  their  guiding  principles.  Idealism 
in  philosophy  does  not  force  its  devotee  to  such  a  theory  of 
the  construction  of  matter  as  that  of  Schelling,  even  though  it 
does  urge  for  a  revaluing  of  physical  conceptions  in  essentially 
the  interest  which  he  was  serving.  Much  of  his  speculation 
\\ ••,[>:  ultra  vires,  in  the  judgment  even  of  those  who  respect  the 
philosophical  tribunal.  Its  partial  annulment,  then,  by  the 
higher  court  of  subsequent  philosophical  opinion  need  create  no 
suspicion  as  to  the  general  propriety  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  of  NaturphUosophia 

It  is  further  true  that  the  failure  of  these  men  is  only  par- 
tial. The  work  which  they  founded  is  not  science,  it  is  true, 
and  no  work  of  similar  character  could  ever  profess  to  perform 
the  function  of  science,  at  any  rate  while  the  realm  of  human 
knowledge  is  organized  as  it  now  is.  But  neither  does  it 
claim  to  do  so.  For  bridging  the  chasm  which  seems  to  sepa- 
rate the  theory  of  knowledge  from  the  results  of  knowledge, 
however,  they  offered  important  suggestions,  and  the  guiding 
principles  which  determined  their  thought  can  be  taken  into 
the  work  of  philosophical  reconstruction  at  the  present  day. 


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